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APPEALABLE ORDERS IN IVNNESOTA
ALAN CUNNINGHAM*
INTRODUCTION**
THREE years after the fusion of law and equity' in Minnesota the
Minnesota territorial legislature passed an act entitled "An Act
to increase the Salaries of certain Territorial officers."'2 Section 18
of that act of March 1, 1856, forms the basis of our present statutory
provisions prescribing what orders are appealable, and in many
respects remains today approximately as originally passed.
New rules having been promulgated for the Minnesota district
court, it is only natural that the advisory committee of the supreme
court should have turned its attention to the possibility of preparing
new rules for appeals to the supreme court. To ascertain the de-
sired future course in the field of appealable orders it is believed
that it is first necessary to examine the past history and present
status of the subject. Only by so doing can the future course be
carefully platted. And only in that way can the proven pitfalls be
avoided. It is therefore the purpose of this article to survey the
past and present status of appealable orders3 in the State of Min-
nesota.
HISTORY
The first provision for the establishment of a court system for
the area which is now Minnesota is contained in the Northwest
Ordinance.# Apparently a single court was to perform the entire
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
**All references to Minnesota Statutes are to Minn. Stat. 1949, and refer-
ences to Rules are to Minn. R. Civ. P.-unless otherwise indicated.
1.Minn. Laws 1853, c. 1.
2. Minn. Laws 1854-56, c. 5.
3. This article deals only with the general civil appeals statute con-
tained in 2 Minn. Stat. c. 605 (1949). It does not treat review by the extraordi-
nary writs such as prohibition and certiorari. Nor does it deal with the multi-
tude of different special statutes relating to appeals under specific chapters
in our statutes, some of which are cited in Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 640, at
653, n. 101 and 102 (1951).
4. See Minn. Laws 1849-53, at p. XV; 1 M. S. A., p. 148.
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judicial function. The first provision for an appellate tribunal seems
to have been in the Act of Congress of April 20, 1836, establishing
the Territorial Government of Wisconsin. The judges comprising
the supreme court also were to act as district court judges. The
Organic Act establishing the Minnesota territorial government
was a carbon copy of the 1836 Congressional Act insofar as the
courts were concerned.6 Since law and equity were not yet fused
even though handled by the same court, our first territorial legis-
lature passed two separate acts for appeals to the territorial supreme
court.7 The first somewhat comprehensive appealable order statutes
were three acts passed in 1851,8 one of which related solely to equity
suits.
Since the 1856 Act9 by its very terms superseded only one of
these three statutes there was some doubt as to whether this Act
of 1856 affected Revised Statutes 1851, c. 94, § 74, relating to
appeals in equity suits. In 1861 Chief Justice Emmett in Folsom v.
Evans"0 stated that the Act of 1856 related only to actions which
before the fusion of law and equity were actions at law, and did
not apply to the former chancery suits. He thought as to the latter
5. See Minn. Laws 1849-53, at p. XXV, § 9
6. See Minn. Laws 1849-53, at p. XXXIII, § 9; 1 M. S. A. 163.
7. Passed November 1, 1849. See Minn. Laws 1849-53, c. XX, § 1;
Minn. Laws 1849-53, c. XX, c. II, § 54 (confined to appeals in chancery).
8. Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 69, § 4; Id. at c. 81, § 11; Id. at c. 94, § 74 (the
last statute related solely to appeals from final or interlocutory orders or
decrees in chancery). The most important of these statutes was Rev. Stat.
1851, c. 81, § 11, which read:
"An appeal may be taken to the supreme court, in the following cases:
"1. In a judgment in an action commenced in the district court, or
brought there from another court; and upon the appeal from that judg-
ment, to review any intermediate order, involving the merits, and neces-
sarily affecting the judgment:
"2. In an order affecting a substantial right, made in such action,
when such order in effect determined the action, and presents [sic pre-
vents] a judgment from which an appeal might be taken:
"3. In a final order affecting a substantial right, made in a special
proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action after judgment."
9. Minn. Laws 1854-56, c. 5, § 18, read:
"Section 11, on page 414 of the Revised Statutes is hereby amended so
as to read as follows:
"Sec. 11-An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court, or brought
there from another court, and upon the appeal from such judgment the
court may review any intermediate order involving the merits or neces-
sarily affecting the judgment. 2. From an order granting or refusing a
provisional remedy, or which grants, refuses or dissolves an injunction.
3. From an order involving the merits of the action or some parts
thereof. 4. From an order granting a new trial. 5. From an order which,
in effect, determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an
appeal might be taken. 6. From a final order affecting a substantial right
made in a special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action
after judgment."
10. 5 Minn. 418 (Gil. 338) (1861).
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the act fusing law and equity saved the prior law as to appeals in
equity suits. Whether or not this was the intent there is little need
to speculate, for with the express repeal of such prior law as might
relate to equity appeals in the Revision of 1866, it is obvious that
Revised Statutes 1851, c. 94, § 74, was abolished. And since that
time, at least, the court has treated the section which had its origin
in section 18 of the 1856 Act as applying to all civil actions, after
that term had come to include both law and equity actions.
New York Origin
The similarity between our appeals statute and that of New
York was frequently mentioned in opinions by some of our earlier
judges. And judicial construction of the New York statute was
accepted as precedent in resolving problems under our statute.1
From these cases and a comparison of the New York appeals statute
of this era, it is obvious that the Act of 1856 was derived from the
Field Code as adopted in New York in 1849. More particularly, our
present § 605.09 stems from ihat part of the Field Code, as enacted,
which governed appeals taken to the Supreme Court, general term,
today called the Supreme Court, Appellate Division.
The first report of the commissioners of the Field Code, sub-
mitted in 1848, dealt very summarily with appeals.' Before adop-
tion, the Field Code, as to appeals to the Supreme Court, general
term, was considerably changed and expanded.' 3 But even that
11. See, e.g., Chouteau v. Parker, 2 Minn. 118 (Gil. 95) (1858); Cum-
mings v. Heard, 2 Minn. 34 (Gil. 25) (1858) ; Rondeau v. Beaumette, 4 Minn.
224 (Gil. 163) (1860) ; Holmes v. Campbell, 13 Minn. 66 (Gil. 58) (1868).
12. As to the Court of Appeals review could be read:
"1. In a judgment in an action commenced therein, or brought there
from another court; and upon the appeal from such judgment, to review
any intermediate order involving the merits, and necessarily affecting thejudgment.
"2. In a final order, affecting a substantial right, made in a special
proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action, after judgment."(Quoting § 11 of that report.)
A to appeals to the Supreme Court, § 299 of that report stated that appeals
could be had in those cases:
"1. When the order grants or refuses a provisional remedy.
"2. When it involves the merit of the action, or some part thereof.
"But no appeal, under this section, shall be taken unless a judge of
the supreme court certify that in his opinion, it is proper, that the ques-
tion arising on the appeal should be decided before the judgment."
13. New York Code of Civil Procedure 1851, § 349, stated that an appeal
could be taken:
"I. When the order grants or refuses a provisional remedy.
"2. When it involves the merits of the action, or some part thereof.
"3. When the order decides a question of practice which in effect
determines the action without a trial, or precludes an appeal.
"4. When the order is made, upon a summary application in an action
after judgment, and affects a substantial right."
1953]
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statute was several times amended before our territorial legisla-
ture copied it.-
Surprisingly enough, New York, like Minnesota, has retained
these provisions in substantially the same form since that time.11
Amendments
With addition of another subdivision and the occasional altera-
tion of some of its subdivisions, the law today is much the same as it
was upon original passage in 1856.
Addition of the one subdivision was accomplished in the Revi-
sion of 1905 by transferring what had been subdivision six to its
present position of subdivision seven and inserting a new sub-
division six which referred to orders supplementary to execution.
This provision for appeals from orders made supplementary to
execution was first enacted in 18896 and was codified under the
execution statutes in the 1894 General Statutes.' 7 It was not trans-
ferred from there until 1905. The subdivision, however, has not
been altered since 1889.
Absolutely no change has taken place since the time of the origi-
14. By 1855 New York Code of Procedure 1855, § 349, read:
"1. When the order grants or refuses, continues or modifies, a pro-
visional remedy; or grants, refuses, or dissolves an injunction.
"2. When it grants or refuses a new trial, or when it sustains or over-
rules a demurrer.
"3. When it involves the merits of the action, or some part thereof,
or affects a substantial right.
"4. When the order in effect determines the action, and prevents a
judgment from which an appeal may be taken.
"5. When the order is made upon a summary application in an action
after judgment, and affects a substantial right."
15. See Clevenger's Practice Manual 1950, § 609. Thus, today this old
§ 349 of the Code of Civil Procedure is now § 692 of the Civil Practice Act,
and allows appeals to be taken to the appellate division of the supreme court:
"1. Where the order grants, refuses, continues or modifies a pro-
visional remedy; or settles, or grants, or refuses an application to re-
settle a case on appeal or a bill of exceptions.
"2. Where it grants or refuses a new trial; except that where specific
question of fact arising upon the issues in an action triable by the court
have been tried by a jury, pursuant to an order for the purpose, an appeal
cannot be taken from an order granting or refusing a new trial upon the
merits.
"3. Where it involves some part of the merits.
"4. Where it affects a substantial right.
"5. Where, in effect, it determines the action and prevents a judg-
ment from which an appeal might be taken.
"6. Where it determines a statutory provision of the state to be un-
constitutional; and the determination appears from the reasons given for
the decision thereupon or is necessarily implied in the decision.
"An order made upon a summary application after after judgment is
deemed to have been made in the action within the meaning of the section."
16. Minn. Laws 1889, c. 106, § 2.
17. Gen. Stat. 1894, § 5489.
[Vol. 37:309
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nal enactment in 1856 in three subdivisions of our appealable orders
statute. These are what are now subdivisions three, five and seven.
And the only change made in the first subdivision was to make
its terminology, as first poorly drafted, conform with what was
obviously intended from the beginning. Thus, the only changes 8
of any substance that have taken place in the 97 years of the statute's
existence are the addition of what is presently subdivision six and
the amendment from time to time of subdivisions two and four.
Subdivision four has received the most legislative attention. The
legislature has altered this subdivision five times, and possibly a
sixth time."" A more detailed statutory history of each subdivision
since 1856 may be found under the ensuing separate discussion of
each subdivision.
Since the supreme court at various times has considered com-
pliance with § 605.09 a jurisdictional prerequisite to appealability2
and since that means that theoretically every case since 1856 has
resolved the issue of appealability, the case law on the subject is
vast. Only those cases, expressly dealing with the issue of appeal-
ability will be here considered. 2- Even so the case law is extensive.
Consequently, § 605.09 will be discussed subdivision by subdivision.
SUBDIVISION ONE
"From a judgment in an action commenced in the district court,
or brought there from another court from any judgment ren-
dered in such court; and upon such appeal the court may review
any intermediate order involving the merits or necessarily affect-
ing the judgment appealed from :"
18. As might be expected, the numbering of this statute has been differ-
ent in the various general Minnesota statutes. In chronological order the
appeals provision appeared as: Rev. Stat. (Terr.) c. 81, § 11; Pub. Stat. 1858,
c. 71, § 11; Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 86, § 8; Gen. Stat. 1878, c. 86, § 8; Gen. Stat.
1894, § 6140; Rev. Stat. 1905, § 4365; Gen. Stat. 1913, § 8001; Mason's Stat.
1923 and 1927, § 9498; and since 1941 has appeared as 2 Minn. Stat. § 605.09.
19. There appears to be no legislative authorization for addition of an
order denying a new trial in Pub. Laws 1858, c. 71, § 11 (4).
20. E.g., Rogers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. W. 580 (1940),
"Appeals from the district court to this court are governed by statute. [citing
and quoting 2 Minn. Stat. § 605.01] * * * The appeal must be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction." See also, e.g., State and R. R. & W. H. Comm. v.
R. I. M. T. Co., 209 Minn. 105, 112, 295 N. W. 519, 524 (1940) ; In re
Ahlman, 185 Minn. 650, 240 N. W. 890 (1932); Meacham v. Ballard & Co.,
180 Minn. 30, 230 N. W. 113 (1930) ; Bakkensen v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 180
Minn. 344, 230 N. W. 787 (1930); Ebeling v. Bayerl, 162 Minn. 379, 202
N. V. 817 (1925).
21. The author at first hoped to exhaust the entire case law. The
ensuing discussion falls short of that desire. But it is hoped that it is com-
plete though not exhaustive.
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History
As this subdivision originally appeared, the language made little
sense. But the Revision of 186622 changed this phraseology so that
the subdivision read substantially as it does today. There are two
short phrases that were not the same as the subdivision now stands
but they in now way alter or render less clear its meaning. These
two changes were made by the revision of 1905,2- and the termi-
nology has remained unchanged since then.
Judgments
For an appeal to be allowed under this subdivision it must be
an appeal from the judgment entered in the district court.24 For
the appeal to lie from a judgment, the judgment must be complete.
For example, where there has been no taxation of costs and it does
not clearly appear that the prevailing party intended to waive the
costs, then the judgment is incomplete and an attempted appeal
will be dismissed as premature.2 5 This is not to say, however, that
an appeal must be taken only from the whole judgment. It has been ex-
pressly held that under this subdivision an appeal can be taken from
part of a judgment.2 6
Under this subdivision the fact that a judgment has been entered
by default in no way affects the appealability of the judgment. It
does, however, mean that the scope of review on the appeal will be
limited to whether or not the judgment on default can be based upon
the complaint and whether that judgment exceeds the prayer for re-
lief.2 7 An application to the district court to correct the error does not
first have to be made before an appeal may be taken, according to the
White2 case. This would be one of the few instances where ex parte
action below may be directly brought to the supreme court, without
first calling the district court's attention to the alleged error. The
22. Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 86, § 8.
23. Rev. Stat. 1905, § 4362.
24. See it re Ahlman, 185 Minn. 650, 241 N. W. 796 (1932) ; Ebeling
v. Bayerl, 162 Minn. 379, 202 N. W. 817 (1925) ; Rase v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S. Ste. M. Ry., 116 Minn. 414, 133 N. W. 986 (1912); Darby v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 109 Minn. 258, 123 N. W. 662 (1909) ; Johnson v. North-
ern Pacific, Fergus Falls & Black Hills Ry., 39 Minn. 30, 38 N. XV. 804(1888) ; Thorp v. Lorenz, 34 Minn. 350, 25 N. IV. 712 (1885).
25. In re Estate of Colby, 223 Minn. 157, 25 N. V. 2d 769 (1947)
Richardson v. Rogers, 37 Minn. 461, 35 N. XV. 270 (1887).
26. Patnode v. May, 182 Minn. 348, 234 N. W. 459 (1931) (defendant
paid damages imposed by judgment, and appealed from judgment for plain-
tiff in ejectment); St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kittson, 84 Minn. 493, 87 N. XV.
1012 (1901).
27. See e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Albert Lea College, 68 Minn. 112,
71 N. XV. 9 (1897) ; White v. Iltis, 24 Minn. 43 (1877).
28. White v. Iltis, 24 Minn. 43 (1877).
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continuing vitality of that case is, however, doubtful in view of
later cases saying that such an application is required before an
appeal may be taken.2' Further, the best practice would seem to
dictate that such an application be made before an appeal be taken. 0
judgments of dismissal, 31 whether with or without prejudice,
are appealable as well as judgments rendered on the merits after
full consideration.
This subdivision has been construed to authorize an appeal
from a judgment entered pursuant to an order modifying a prior
judgment, i.e., an appeal may be had from a modified judgment.3 2
The appeal authorized by this subdivision is from the judgment,
and not from orders which have as their ultimate purpose the entry
of judgment. The reason such orders are not appealable under this
subdivision is that they are not judgments, and the reason that
generally they are not appealable under other subdivisions is that
they are intermediate orders looking to judgment, rather than
final orders. However, this does not mean that the aggrieved party
is denied all right to review for even if the prevailing party does not
enter a judgment, the aggrieved party may cause judgment to be
entered and then appeal from that judgment. 3
Scope of Review
As indicated by the express terms of this subdivision, such inter-
mediate orders as involve the merits or affect the judgment may be
29. Gederholm v. Davies, 59 Minn. 1, 60 N. W. 676 (1894) (defaultjudgment); cf. Pope v. Ramsey County State Bank, 140 Minn. 502, 167
N. W. 280 (1918) (judgment entered upon ex parte application after re-
mittitur).
30. But see the discussion of Halvorsen v. Orinoco Mining Co., 89
Minn. 470, 95 N. W. 320 (1930), and Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20
N. W. 2d 702 (1945), in text to n. 45 and 46, infra, for a pitfall that an
appellant must guard against after making such an application so as not to
suddenly find all appellate review is barred.
31. H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 486,
31 N. W. 2d 277 (1948) ; Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166,
9 N. W. 2d 346 (1943) ; Thorp v. Lorenz, 34 Minn. 350, 25 N. W. 712 (1885).
32. Billsborrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336, 128 N. XV. 16 (1910) ; Malm-
gren v. Phinney, 65 Minn. 25, 67 N. W. 649 (1896). On such an appeal the
Billsborrow, case, siupra, states that:
"* * * any intermediate order affecting the merits or the judgment may
be reviewed. The order in such cases does not become res judicata."
But a modified judgment must be entered; otherwise the order modifying
the judgment may be considered a post-judgment order made on summary
application and so appealable only under subdivision seven. See Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Brown, 181 Minn. 446, 233 N. W. 10 (1930).
33. For a case in which appellant did this, see Bolstad v. Paul Bunyon
Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346 (1943), and for a case in which the
court said this procedure was proper, see Rase v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry., 116 Minn. 414, 133 N. IV. 986 (1912). But see Judge Stone's dissent
in Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. W. (1940), and 24 Minn. L. Rev.
859 (1940).
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reviewed on appeal from the judgment. This is so regardless of
whether or not the orders were themselves appealable (so long
as they were not actually appealed from and heard on appeal) and
regardless of whether or not the time for appeal from such orders
has expired.34 Accordingly, on appeal from a judgment after a
second trial on the issue of damages only, an order in the first trial
on the issue of liability may be reviewed. 35 This is so because the
doctrine of law of the case does not make final and binding upon the
supreme court the intermediate orders of the lower court; 36 nor
could the doctrine have such an effect in view of the statutory
language used. But this rule must of necessity be subject to possible
exception in certain lengthy statutory proceedings, where orders
may be final unless appealed from.
But the review, of course, extends only to those prior pro-
ceedings which involve the merits or affect the judgment; those
which are not of such a nature are not reviewable on appeal from
the judgment.3 7 That is, an order which does not in any way lead
up to the final judgment may not be reviewed on appeal from the
judgment. Thus, for example, in Bolstad v. Paid Bunyan Oil Co.,35
the court held non-reviewable a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the disagreement of the jury on an appeal from a judgment
of dismissal for it was no part of the proceedings resulting in that
judgment.
An appeal from the judgment, however, does not bring up for
review proceedings taken subsequent to its rendition.39 So in Berg-
nan v. Williams,40 the appeal having been taken from the judgment,
the court was without authority to review the lower court's denial
of a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, which motion was made after entry of judgment. Nor
on an appeal from the judgment may the court review the lower
34. Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn., 230 N. W. 473 (1930); Bills-
borrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336, 128 N. W. 16 (1910) ; Keegan v. Peterson,
24 Minn. 1 (1877) ; see Zywiec v. City of South St. Paul, 234 Minn. 18, 47
N. W. 2d 465 (1951) (but this is not true where the appeal is from the order
denying a new trial after the second trial).
35. Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 473 (1930) ; see Zywiec
v. City of South St. Paul, 234 Minn. 18, 47 N. W. 2d 465 (1951).
36. See Billsborrow v. Pierce, 112 Minn. 336, 128 N. W. 16 (1910).
37. Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346(1943) ; Keegan v. Peterson, 24 Minn. 1 (1877) ; cf. Storey v. Weinberg, 226
Minn. 48, 31 N. W. 2d 912 (1948) (appeal from order granting new trial
does not bring up denial of defendant's motion for dismissal on merits since
that order involved no part of proceedings resulting in order granting new
trial).
38. 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346 (1943).
39. Bergman v. Williams, 173 Minn. 250, 217 N. W. 127 (1927).
40. 173 Minn. 250, 217 N. W. 127 (1927)
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court's later order refusing to settle a case,41 nor the denial of a
motion to vacate the judgment and allow the plaintiff to amend his
complaint to state a cause of action,42 nor the order relieving a
party from default and granting him leave to answer or amend
(made under the now superseded discretionary part of § 544.32)
made after entry of judgment,43 nor the denial of a motion to amend
a default judgment so as to conform with the prayer for relief.44
The last mentioned situation, that arising in the Halvorsen45 case,
seems extremely harsh since the court there declared that the de-
fendant was entitled to the relief requested and indicated that it
would have granted it on an appeal from the judgment but for the
fact that the denial of the motion to amend the order was itself
appealable under subdivisions three and seven, and not having
been appealed from, the lower court's action was held to be law of
the case. Thus the court cut the defendant off from obtaining any
of the relief to which he was admittedly entitled. Such a result seems
too close an adherance to the doctrine of law of the case, and means
that the defendant must either 1) not move the district court to
correct its error, a result clearly in disharmony witli the practice
which the supreme court has consistently championed, or 2) appeal
not only from the judgment but also from every subsequent order
(and within the thirty-day time limit therefor) so as to prevent
a rather blind following of the doctrine of law of the case re-
sulting in a denial of relief he both seeks and is entitled to. Un-
fortunately the Halvorsen case was followed recently when the same
situation arose in the A umnan 40 case.
But this does not mean that on an appeal from the judgment
the taxation of costs and disbursements cannot be reviewed. Fall v.
Moore4 7 holds that the taxation of costs may be reviewed on appeal
from the judgment. Undoubtedly the reason for this view is that
the judgment is, as previously stated, incomplete until costs are
taxed. Thus, this is not a matter occurring subsequent to judgment
but rather is part of the judgment. In this connection it has been
41. McGovern v. Federal Land Bank, 209 Minn. 403, 296 N. W. 473
(1941).
42. Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146 Minn. 316, 178 N. W. 959 (1920).
43. Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Hawley, 154 Minn. 538, 191
N. W. 815 (1923).
44. Halvorsen v. Orinoco Mining Co., 89 Minn. 470, 95 N. W. 320(1903) ; Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20 N. W. 2d 702 (1945).
45. Halvorsen v. Orinoco Mining Co., 89 Minn. 470, 95 N. W. 320
(1903).
46. Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20 N. W. 2d 702 (1945).
47. 45 Minn. 517, 48 N. W. 404 (1891). For a different interpretation
of this case, see Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 640, at 642 (1951).
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held that an aggrieved party may appeal from the judgment of the
lower court which only taxes costs and disbursements, at least
where the de minimus rule is not applicable.
43
This subdivision was said to authorize appeals from judgments
in civil actions only in the early McNamara" case and did not
authorize an appeal to be taken from a judgment entered in a
special proceeding.
SUBDIVISION Two
"From an order granting or refusing a provisional remedy, or
which grants, refuses, dissolves, or refuses to dissolve, an in-
junction, or an order vacating or sustaining an attachment :"
History
Since the time of its original enactment in 1856 this subdivision
has been altered only twice. In 1861 the concluding phrase "... . or
vacating or sustaining an attachment" was added50 and in 1866 the
words ". . . or refuses to dissolve. . ." were added to the provisions
dealing with, injunctions. 51 Since 1866 the subdivision has re-
mained unchanged.
The relatively little judicial attention that this subdivision has
required to date is undoubtedly primarily caused by its clear and
explicitly stated scope. In one instance, however, its scope is not
clear.
Provisional Remedy
The supreme court once said that ".... provisional remedies have
been enumerated as including arrest, attachment, bail, claim and
delivery, injunction, ne exeat, and receivership. ' ' 52 It may, however,
be doubted whether this was intended to be an all inclusive listing.
The phrase "provisional remedy" was copied from the Field Code
and although the phrase is used several times in that Code, there
apparently was no attempt to define its meaning. Perhaps the
48. Salo v. Duluth & I. R. R., 124 Minn. 361, 145 N. W. 114 (1914).
Contra: Fay v. Davidson, 13 Minn. 298 (Gil. 275) (1868). The Fay case
might be harmonized with the prior case on one of two grounds: 1) the merits
of the action yet remained for judicial determination in that case, whereas they
had already been resolved irr the Salo case, or 2) in the Fay case the costs
were only $26.49 so as to make the de minimus rule applicable. This latter
suggestion is of dubious merit when the early date of the case is considered.
Probably the Fay case is no longer law on the subject, at least the Salo case.
49. McNamara v. Minnesota Central Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269)
(1867).
50. Minn. Laws 1861, c. 22, § 1.
51. Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 86, § 8.
52. In re Trusteeship of Melgaard, 187 Minn. 632, 634, 246 N. V. 478,
479 (1933) (court offered no authority for the quoted statement).
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truest judicial utterance on the scope of this term appears in Folsom
v. Evans'3 where Chief Justice Emmett said:
"What is and what is not a provisional remedy under our
statute is not easily defined."
That language might appropriately be amended to read that it is
still not clear what is meant.
In the Folsom case it was thought that the phrase referred only
to legal provisional remedies and so would not include an order
vacating the appointment of a receiver in an equitable proceeding.
This, however, cannot be accepted as the law, for a short time later
orders appointing a receiver5 4 and also refusing to appoint a re-
ceiver 55 were held appealable as orders granting or refusing a pro-
visional remedy.
As the judicial pronouncements now stand, it is impossible to
determine the breadth of the phrase. There are few guide posts in
the decided cases, one reason perhaps being that it has not often been
necessary to rely on this provision to sustain an appeal. Five cases,
other than those mentioned above, are about all that throw any
light on the problem.
In Brunn v. Brunn, a divorce proceeding, an appeal was at-
tempted from an order denying an application for suit money,
attorney fees and alimony pendente lite. The court held such denial
of monetary relief appealable as denying a provisional remedy. In
doing so it relied upon a case reaching the same result but where
the order was considered appealable under subdivision three."7 The
order also divided custody of the children pendente lite and dis-
solved an order restraining the husband from interferring with his
wife or children and from disposing of his property. These orders
the court held nonappealable.
In Heachiam v. Ballard & Co.5 s the court held that an order
impounding funds pending the action to determine who is entitled
to the funds is not the granting or denying of a provisional remedy.
An order granting or denying a motion for inspection of books
and papers was held not to be a provisional remedy and so not
appealable in the Melgaard5 9 case.
53. 5 Minn. 418 (Gil. 338), at 420 (Gil. 340) (1861).54. State cx rel Burdic v. Egan, 62 Minn. 280, 64 N. W. 813 (1895).
55. Grant v. Webb, 21 Minn. 39 (1874).56. 166 Minn. 283, 207 N. W. 616 (1926). See Burkholder v. Burk-holder, 231 Minn. 285, 288, 43 N. W. 2d 801, 803 (1950) (based on Brunn case).57. Schuster v. Schuster, 84 Minn. 403, 87 N. W. 1014 (1901).
58. 180 Minn. 30, 230 N. W. 113 (1930).
59. In re Trustship of Melgaard, 187 Minn. 632, 246 N. W. 478 (1933).
This case will undoubtedly govern orders made under Rule 34.
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The denial of a motion to have tried and determined the validity
of a contract not to sue in a court other than in the state of resi-
dence or injury before that part of the action relating to negligence
and damages was heard was in Detwiler v. Lowden6" held to be no
denial of a provisional remedy, at least where it is apparent from the
court's order that it was not a denial on the merits but only a post-
ponement of its hearing until the trial of the entire action.
But an order cancelling and expunging from the record a
notice of lis pendens filed with the register of deedswas held appeal-
able under this subdivision in the Rehnberg6' case. However, the
one sentence opinion shed no light on the court's reasoning.
In three of the five last mentioned cases it would seem that
the court might be trying to place some limitations on the right to
appeal where the order involved a provisional remedy. In the
Detwiler case Judge Holt said the order was not final, and when
taken to task for this, a per curiam opinion explained that the motion
must be denied on the merits to be appealable as denying a provisional
remedy, rather than merely postponing the determination of whether
a provisional remedy should be granted or denied. And in the
Melgaard case the court relied on cases from other states which
held the order nonappealable because interlocutory. The opinion did
not state that that was the ground for holding the order non-
appealable as not granting or denying a provisional remedy. But
Judge Stone felt compelled to dissent because he thought the court
was writing into this subdivision the requirement that the order
cannot be interlocutory, a requirement not justified by the plain
language of the subdivision. And some of the language of Brunn v.
Brunn would indicate that the court might have considered part of
the order as not denying a provisional remedy because it did not
deny even temporarily an absolute right.
It is impossible from any of these cases to lay down definite
general rules. But they would seem to indicate a predisposition on
the part of the court to treat as nonappealable an order involving
a provisional remedy unless the order was based on the merits
and clearly affected some right of the parties.
Injunctions
- Little need be said about this part of the subdivision. It is clear
and has caused the court very little difficulty. The court has con-
60. 198 Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367, 838 (1936).
61. Rehnberg v. Minnesota Homes, Inc., 235 Minn. 558, 49 N. W. 2d 196(1951). The order necessarily had to be considered as granting or refusing
a provisional remedy since it in no way purported to invole injunctive relief
nor was attachment in any way involved in the strict sense of that word.
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strued the word "injunction" as the generic term which includes
a temporary injunction. Thus it has held appealable an order grant-
ing a temporary injunction 62 as well as an order dissolving a
temporary injunction 3 where such orders were made after a hear-
ing with both sides being present. The court has also held appeal-
able an order modifying an injunction and suspending it in part
since it was in effect an order dissolving the injunction pro tanto.6 4
But an order for entry of judgment restraining the defendant
is not appealable under this subdivision.3 This is because the sub-
division refers to orders which in and of themselves grant the
injunction and do not depend upon entry of judgment for their
effectiveness. But where the order only directs entry of a judgment
that would have injunctive effect, that order is not within the orders
contemplated by this subdivision. Such reasoning seems a bit
formalistic. Certainly the provision is susceptible to the opposite
interpretation, with no great evil flowing from such an approach.
The court has at various times held that a temporary injunction
issued ex parte is not an appealable order, 6 even though the
second subdivision contains no such restriction. This wholesome
rule is based on the idea that the supreme court will not hear an
appeal from an order until the district court has had an opportunity
to pass on the matter after hearing both sides.
Two cases merit discussion on the provision relating to injunc-
tions. In Kanevsky v. National Council of Knights and Ladies of
SCcurity' 7 an action had been commenced to cancel a benefit certifi-
cate. The substituted defendants in that action instituted an action
to collect the proceeds of the certificate. Plaintiffs in the first named
suit sought an order in that suit to restrain the other parties from
62. Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Minn. 320, 46 N. W. 2d 654 (1951) (no
appearance by defendant) ; Fuller v. Schultz, 88 Minn. 372, 93 N. W. 118(1903).
63. Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minn. 449, 170 N. W.597 (1919). An order refusing to vacate or dissolve a temporary injunction
is also appealable, see Bellows v. Ericson, 233 Mim. 320, 46 N. W. 2d 654(1951).
64. Weaver v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 30 Minn. 477, 16
N. W. 269 (1883).
65. Holliston v. Ernston, 120 Minn. 507, 139 N. W. 805 (1913); John-
son v. Northern Pacific, Fergus Falls & Black Hills Ry., 39 Minn. 30, 38
N. W. 804 (1888).66. E.g., Fuller v. Schultz, 88 Mim. 372, 93 N. W. 118 (1903); State
v. District Court, 52 Minn. 283, 53 N. W. 1157 (1893) ; Schurmeler v. FirstDivision St. Paul & Pacific R. R., 12 Minn. 351 (Gil. 228) (1867) ; Hoffman
v. Mann, 11 Minn. 364 (Gil. 262) (1866). But see Bellows v. Ericson, 233Minn. 320, 46 N. W. 2d 654 (1951) (a writ of prohibition proceeding where
an order granting a temporary injunction was said to be appealable althoughdefendant did not appear, this point not being discussed).67. 132 Minn. 422, 157 N. W. 646 (1916).
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proceeding with the other action until the first suit had gone to
judgment. The denial of this motion was held appealable under
subdivision two as one denying a provisional remedy or an injunc-
tion. On the authority of the Kanevsky case the court recently held
appealable an order denying a motion to restrain additional pro-
ceedings in the same action in which the motion was made."" But
in the same case the court held nonappealable an order which denied
motions to postpone further proceedings in the suit.6'
The result is that an appeal may be had from an attempt to
temporarily enjoin the determination of certain issues in the same
or an independent proceeding if phrased so as to seek an injunction,
but precisely the same attempt will result in a nonappealable order
if the relief sought is denominated a stay instead of an injunction-
an extremely formalistic result.
The other case is Brunn v. Brunn.70 The court there held non-
appealable an order dissolving an order restraining the husband
from in any way interferring with his wife or the children and from
disposing of his assets. Since it is unlikely that the dissolution
was entered ex parte, the court at least did not base its result on this
ground, the holding seems squarely contra to the express terms of
the statute and may well not be followed in the future. It is a very
short per curiam opinion and seems explainable only on the ground
that it is erroneous.
Attachment
The case of Davidson v. Owensl is interesting in that it was
undoubtedly the cause of the specific reference to attachment in this
subdivision and was also the case making that reference unnecessary.
The court had dismissed an appeal from an order vacating a writ of
attachment, not aware of the statutory change as to appeals brought
about in 1856. Then on rehearing its attention was called to the
existence of the Act of 1856 and, forfeited with this, the court
promptly reversed itself by holding that the order was appealable as
denying a provisional remedy.
An order refusing to dissolve and vacate an attachment is an
order sustaining the attachment, and so is appealable. 7 The same
is true of an order setting aside an order dissolving a writ of attach-
68. Plunkett v. Lambert, 231 Minn. 848, 43 N. W. 2d 489 (1950).
69. To the same effect, see Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269
N. W. 367, 838 (1936) ; Graves v. Backus, 69 Minn. 532, 72 N. W. 811 (1897).
70. 166 Minn. 283, 207 N. W. 616 (1926).
71. 5 Minn. 69 (Gil. 50) (1860).
72. Ely v. Titus, 14 Minn. 125 (Gil. 93) (1869).
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ment and levy on real property and reinstating that levy.7 3 If the
order does not also reinstate the writ, but only continues the matter
for further hearings, the order is not appealable. In that case the
order would neither sustain nor vacate an attachment, but would
only vacate an order dissolving an attachment.
7 4
It would appear that where a writ of attachment is dissolved
by giving a bond therefor, the plaintiff may appeal from the dis-
solution of the attachment,75 but the defendant who gave the
bond cannot thereafter appeal from an earlier order refusing to
dissolve the attachment.
7 6
SUBDIVIsIoN THREE
"From an order involving the merits of the action or some part
thereof :"
Judicial Limitations
Although short and although the legislature -has not amended
this subdivision since its original enactment, this subdivision has
continually necessitated discussion in the supreme court's opinions.
There are perhaps two major reasons for this. First, the use of
indefinite and undefinable terms causes great uncertainty as to just
what is intended to be included within its scope. Second, this sub-
division squarely heads up the two basic, but conflicting, policy con-
siderations in determining at what stage in the proceedings an
appeal should be allowed to review error of the trial court. One
consideration favors the earliest possible appeal so that the re-
mainder of the trial will not be based on the earlier erroneous action.
The other consideration is that it is desirable to facilitate the judicial
machinery by being able to completely dispose of any given action
in one appeal. Disgruntled attorneys desiring vindication for their
position which was rejected at a preliminary skirmish are likely
to favor the former, whereas our court, as have many others, tends
to favor the latter. The court has several times noted that:
"This remarkably liberal provision has been a veritable stalking-
horse behind which appeals from all kinds of intermediate
orders have crept into the supreme court, causing vexatious de-
lays in the trial of actions on the merits. ' 77
Thus, it is not surprising that the court has strictly construed the
73. Van Dam v. Baker, 164 Minn. 130, 204 N. W. 633 (1925).
74. See Van Dam v. Baker, 164 Minn. 130, 204 N. W. 633 (1925).
75. Gale v. Seifert, 39 Minn. 171, 39 N. W. 69 (1888).
76. Thomas v. Graig, 60 Minn. 501, 62 N. W. 1133 (1895).
77. Rogers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. W. 580 (1940) ; Bond v.
Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 63 N. W. 3 (1895) (the court adding to this statement:
"and in adding to the burdens of the court.").
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phrase "involving the merits." Following the lead of New York,
the court imposed the judicial limitation that to come within the
purview of this phrase the order must affect the strict or positive
legal rights of the parties; and if, instead, it merely relates to
those questions of practice or procedure that the trial court regu-
lates for itself, or relates to matters depending upon the discretion
or favor of the trial court the order is not appealable."5 And this
limitation has been retained by the court. 79 Several cases, picking
up the language McMahon v. Davidson,"0 have added the require-
ment that the order must be finally determinative of that right relied
upon to make the order appealable. 6' Thus, if the order leaves the
matter still pending before the court, it quite obviously will not be
considered appealable under this subdivision. It may safely be
assumed that this added requirement is firmly imbedded in the
judicial determination of what constitutes "involving the merits."
Useful as these limitations are in preventing every order of the
trial judge from being appealable and although the limitations are
of some aid in predicting what orders may be appealable, even
tested by these standards it is still difficult to determine just which
of the host of various types of orders are or are not appealable
under this provision. And since reference must necessarily be made
to this subdivision to determine the appealability of most of the
orders which may be made as a consequence of the adoption of the
new rules of procedure in this state a more detailed examination
of the case law is imperative.
Pleading Stage Orders
1. Setting Aside Pleading
An order refusing to set aside service of summons has been
held appealable 2 on the ground that it compels the defendant to
78. Chouteau v. Parker, 2 Minn. 118 (Gil. 95) (1858); Piper v.
Johnston, 12 Minn. 60 (Gil. 27) (1866); McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn.
357 (Gil. 232) (1867) (adding that it must be decisive of the question in-
volved) ; Holmes v. Campbell, 13 Minn. 66 (Gil. 58) (1868).
79. Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950);
Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. AV. 580 (1940) ; Gilmore v. City
of Mankato, 198 Minn. 148, 269 N. W. 113 (1936) ; Edelstein v. Levine, 179
Minn. 136, 228 N. W. 558 (1930) ; Seeling v. Deposit Bank & Trust Co.,
176 Minn. 11, 222 N. W. 295 (1928) ; Piano Mfg. Co. v. Kaufert, 86 Minn.
13, 89 N. W. 1124 (1902); Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, 66 Minn.
447, 69 N. W. 224 (1896).
80. 12 Minn. 357 (Gil. 232) (1867).
81. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. XV. 580 (1940);
Wilmore v. City of Mankato, 198 Minn. 148, 269 N. W. 113 (1936) ; Seeling
v. Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 176 Minn. 11, 222 N. W. 295 (1928).
82. Dillon v. Gunderson, 235 Mii. 208, 50 N. W. 2d 275 (1951) ; Curran
v. Nash, 224 Minn. 571, 29 N. W. 2d 436 (1947) ; Plano Mfg. Co. v. Kaufert,
86 Minn. 13, 89 N. W. 1124 (1902).
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defend on the merits of the case when, if the court's determination
is erroneous, it has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. So, thinks
the court, this affects the defendant's strict legal rights and is not a
mere question of practice. One case apparently assumed that an
order setting aside service of summons was appealable and, con-
trary to the clear meaning of subdivision one, considered the order
res judicata [sic law of the case] on an appeal from the judgment
when no timely appeal was taken from the order.83 However, in one
case the court has held nonappealable an order denying a motion
to dismiss the action, even though the motion was made on the basis
of lack of jurisdiction.84 But an order which denies a motion to set
aside the complaint on the ground that it varies from the summons
is not appealable.-5 An order which did set aside the complaint on
that or similar grounds, however, probably would be appealable
by analogy to cases dealing with the striking of answers, but no
cases have been found.
2. Amending Pleadings
On numerous occasions it has been held that no appeal could
be had from an order granting"6 or denying8 7 a motion to amend
pleadings, if that motion was made before judgment. The order
could be reviewed on an appeal from the judgment or ruling on
motion for a new trial and to allow an appeal from the order would
needlessly hinder and delay the proceedings. Finally, in Swanson v.
Alworth" the appeal was attempted from a denial of a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint on the ground that it involved the
merits. This view was rejected even though the trial court had said
its denial was based on legal principles and not on its discretion. The
court referred to the general rule enunciated in the above cases
and pointed out that they did not think such rule should depend
upon whether or not the order was based upon the judge's dis-
83. H. L. Spencer v. Koell, 91 Minn. 226, 97 N. W. 974 (1904).
84. Pillsbury v. Foley, 61 Minn. 434, 63 N. W. 1027 (1895).85. Board of County Comm'rs of Sibley County v. Young, 21 Minn. 335(1875).
86. Greber v. Harris, 167 Minn. 522, 209 N. W. 30 (1926) (amended
reply) ; Stromme v. Rieck, 110 Minn. 472, 125 N. W. 1021 (1910) (supple-
mental complaint) ; Winona v. Minnesota Ry. Construction Co., 25 Minn. 328(1878) (amended complaint).
87. Burkholder v. Burkholder, 231 Minn. 285, 43 N. W. 2d 801 (1950)(supplemental paragraph to complaint); Chicago Great Western R. R. v.Zahner, 149 Minn. 27, 182 N. W. 904 (1921) (amended answer) ; Blied v.
Barnard, 130 Minn. 534, 153 N. W. 305 (1915) (supplemental answer);
Itasca Cedar & Tie Co. v. McKinley, 129 Minn. 536, 152 N. W. 653 (1915)(amended complaint) ; Hanley v. Board of County Comm'rs of Cass Co., 87
Minn. 209, 91 N. W. 756 (1902) (amended notice of contest, i.e., complaint).
88. 157 Minn. 312, 196 N. W. 260 (1923).
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cretionary power. At this juncture it should be noted that an order
allowing the amendment of pleadings after judgment has been held
appealable under this subdivision2 9
3. Striking Pleadings
An order striking all or a part of the pleading is appealable
under this subdivision on the ground that the order determines that
the matters struck are insufficient to make out the party's case and
he is deprived of his right to prove his case by submission of
evidence thereon.90 The same reasoning has been applied so as to
hold appealable an order to make the pleadings more definite
and certain, or in default thereof, to strike.91 It should be noted that
these cases allowed the appeal from a conditional order while the
condition yet remained, a fact which usually makes nonappealable
an otherwise appealable order.
On the other hand, an order refusing to strike all or a part of
the pleading is not appealable because it is not a final order dis-
posing of the matter involved but instead leaves the question still
pending before the court.92 Likewise, an order denying a motion
to make more definite and certain is nonappealable 9 3
In addition to the arguments that might be asserted to sustain
the above stated rules as to orders involving the striking of plead-
ings, such an interpretation of subdivision three seems to accord
with the expressed legislative policy by analogy to that part of sub-
division four which relates to demurrers. An order which strikes
89. North v. Webster, 36 Minn. 99, 30 N. W. 429 (1886) (complaint
amended, the right not to have to relitigate apparently the reason for result);
see Stromme v. Rieck, 110 Minn. 472, 125 N. W. 1021 (1910).
90. Lowe v. Nixon, 170 Minn. 391, 212 N. W. 896 (1927) (part of
answer); Floody v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 104 Minn. 132, 116 N. W.
111 (1908) (demurrer to complaint stricken) ; Vermilye v. Vermilye, 32
Minn. 499, 18 N. W. 832 (1884) (part of answer); Kingsley v. Gilman,
12 Minn. 515 (Gil. 425) (1867) (part of answer) ; Starbuck v. Dunldee, 10
Minn. 168 (Gil. 136) (1865) (part of answer). Whether the result would be
the same where a pleading is stricken under Rule 37.02(c) is a question which
only future decision can answer.
91. Baer v. Waseca Milling Co., 143 Minn. 483, 171 N. W. 767 (1919)
(going to answer); Lovering v. Webb Publishing Co., 108 Minn. 201, 120
N. W. 688 (1909) (going to complaint).
92. Lowe v. Nixon, 170 Minn. 391, 212 N. W. 896 (1927) (part of
reply) ; Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, 66 Minn. 447, 69 N. W. 224
(1896) (objection to report, treated as answer) ; National Albany Exchange
Bank v. Cargill, 39 Minn. 477, 40 N. W. 570 (1888) (answer); Exley v.
Berryhill, 36 Minn. 117, 30 N. W. 436 (1886) (part of complaint) ; Rice v.
First Div. St. P. & P. R. R., 24 Minn. 447 (1878) (part of complaint) ; see
Vermilye v. Vermilye, 32 Minn. 499, 18 N. W. 832 (1884).
93. State v. O'Brien, 83 Minn. 6, 85 N. W. 1135 (1901) (going to com-
plaint); American Book Co. v. Kingdom Pub. Co., 71 Minn. 363, 73 N. W.
1089 (1898) (going to complaint).
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or refuses to strike has substantially the same effect on the suit
as an order sustaining or overruling a demurrer. An order sustain-
ing a demurrer is appealable. So also is an order striking part of
the pleadings. But an order overruling a demurrer is appealable
only within a very limited area. An order refusing to strike is non-
appealable. Thus, the interpretation under subdivision three parallels
the policy expressed in subdivision four.
4. Changing Parties
Even though it may prevent removal of the action, an order
amending the pleadings so as to make a former party defendant a
party plaintiff is not appealable since it leaves for future disposition
all the issues exactly as they had been prior to the order.9 4
There are at least three ways persons not originally parties to an
action may become parties. These are 1) by motion of a party to
bring in an additional party pursuant to Rule 14, 2) interpleader
under Rule 22, or 3) intervention under Rule 24.
A. Bringing in Additional Parties
An order granting"' or denying9 6 a motion to bring in an addi-
tional party is nonappealable because it is not finally decisive of
some positive legal right of either the movant or the person who
would be brought in. Although the decisions referred to antedate
the promulgation of Rule 14.01, the above stated principles will un-
doubtedly apply to Rule 14 orders.
B. Interpleader
An order granting an interpleader, when made under circum-
stances where the statute allowed such an order, does not involve
the merits 7 because it leaves unresolved the rights of the plaintiff
to the fund and such rights may subsequently be determined be-
tween the adverse claimants. The court in the case announcing this
rule, Seeling v. Deposit Bank & Trust Co.,98 expressly left open
the appealability of an order granting an interpleader under cir-
cumstances other than those authorized by the now superseded
statute governing interpleader. Since that case seems to be the
94. Gilmore v. City of Mankato, 198 Minn. 148, 269 N. W. 113 (1936).95. Finnegan v. Meyer & Sons, Inc., 230 Minn. 583, 41 N. W. 2d 818(1950).
96. Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950) ; Leve-
tek v. National Surety Corp., 203 Minn. 324, 281 N. W. 260 (1938) ; McClearn
v. Arnold, 173 Minn. 183, 217 N. W. 106 (1927).
97. Seeling v. Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 176 Minn. 11, 222 N. W.
295 (1928).
98. 176 Minn. 11, 222 N. W. 295 (1928).
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only one on the subject, this question still remains unanswered.
Also unresolved is the appealability of an order refusing an inter-
pleader where the statute, now the rule, authorized the interpleader.
A prediction might be hazarded that such orders made under
Rule 22 will be held nonappealable on the ground that such an
order still leaves the issues as they had been. This rule, however,
is susceptible of a practical interpretation that when a defendant has
complied with its conditions he has a right to an order for inter-
pleader and if so an order denying this might be considered to affect
his strict legal rights.
C. Intervention
There seems to be only one old and somewhat unsatisfactory case
on taking an appeal from an order involving intervention. This
dearth of authority is undoubtedly due in part to the fact that inter-
vention was accomplished by the act of the person who wanted to
become a party and not by order of the court. In Bennett v. Whit-
comb9l that court treated an order denying an intervention as
though it were an order striking the intervention papers from the
files on the ground that the statute did not authorize the interven-
tion. The court then stated that for the order to be appealable it
must adversely affect the strict rights of the intervenor, and to deter-
mine this it was necessary to see whether there was any merit
in the attempt to intervene. Finding that there was no such merit,
that the intervenor would realize neither gain nor loss by any
judgment in the action, ihe court held that the order was non-
appealable. Such an approach seems undesirable. By it the court
must determine the exact issues that would be necessary to a
disposition of the appeal on the merits. Consequently, it may be
doubted whether the court will retain this approach if the question
is again presented. If the intervenor is not allowed to come into
the case it would seem that the appealability of the order would
be determined by the same considerations as discussed in relation
to an order denying a motion for interpleader. However, here there
is one possible additional factor that might favor allowing an appeal.
Such an order would not be reviewable on an appeal from the judg-
ment or order denying a new trial because the aggrieved person
would not be a party thereto and because it would not be an inter-
mediate order leading to judgment or the order denying a new
trial. Arguably, the last consideration could also be stressed as to
an order denying an interpleader, but with less force. However,
99. 25 Minn. 148 (1878).
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in In re Condemnation of Lands Owned by Luhrs,100 a special
proceedings case, the court stated that the general rule is that an
order granting intervention is not appealable, and then quoted
Corpus Juris Secundum for the proposition that an order either
permitting or refusing intervention is not appealable because it is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Rule 24 covers both intervention as of right and permissive
intervention. It is conceivable that the court would hold appeal-
able an order refusing intervention when intervenor claims to come
under the "as of right" provision and hold a similar order non-
appealable where permissive intervention is involved.
Change of Venue
The order granting' - or denying'0 2 a motion for change of
venue, at least where not as of right, is not appealable on the ground
that it does not involve the merits. In the Allis'03 case the court
recognized that the order granting the motion is a final order
disposing of the action in that particular court but deemed the prac-
tice favoring review of the order by other means too well established
to hold the order appealable. The court urged mandamus as the
best method to seek review of the order. W"rhere, however, the filing
of affidavits itself effects the change of venue review of the change of
venue has been allowed two other ways. In Flowers v. Bartlett04
objection was made to hearing a demurrer in court to which the
action had been transferred, and on appeal from the order over-
ruling the demurrer the court said they could review the matter
of change of venue. In Chadbourne v. Reed'05 the case was noted
on the calendar of the court from which the action had been trans-
ferred. An appeal was taken from the order striking the case
from the calendar, and on the appeal the court reviewed the matter
of change of venue.
The Chadbourne case stated that an order striking the action
from the calendar, the effect of which was merely to postpone the
trial, was not appealable. But the court went on to hold that when
the effect of the striking order was to determine that no trial could
100. 220 Minn. 129, 19 N. W. 2d 77 (1945).
101. Winegar v. Martin, 148 Minn. 489, 182 N. W. 513 (1921), 5 Minn.
L. Rev. 566.
102. MfcClearn v. Arnold, 173 Minn. 183, 217 N. W. 106 (1927) ; Allis
v. White, 59 Minn. 97, 60 N. W. 809 (1894) ; Carpenter v. Comfort, 22 Minn.
539 (1876).
103. 59 Minn. 97, 60 N. W. 809 (1894).
104. 66 Minn. 213, 68 N. W. 976 (1896).
105. 83 Minn. 447, 86 N. W. 415 (1901).
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ever be had in that court on that action the order is appealable
as involving the merits.
Striking Case from Calendar
When, however, a situation such as the Chadbourne case is not
presented, an order striking the case from the 'calendar is not
appealable. 10
Stipulations
Two old cases have held an order setting aside a stipulation
appealable.10 7 They were based on the idea that the setting aside
of a stipulation was more than merely an amendment of the plead-
ings and that the order deprived a party of a positive legal right
to have the stipulation enforced. No subsequent cases have been
found directly, passing on the appealability of such an order. It
may,, however, be questioned whether these cases would be blindly
followed. Since stipulations may arise in different ways and go to a
great variety of matters, it might be supposed that the appealability
of such an order would hinge upon whether it took on the aspects
of a contract, or was less, what elements of the action it would
affect, and whether it could be set aside in the discretion of the court.
And although no cases have been found directly questioning the
appealability of an order refusing to set aside a stipulation it would
seem that the question would be resolved on the same considera-
tions. Nor would it be too surprising that if the court should in the
future hold an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a stipula-
tion appealable, that it might later hold other such orders non-
appealable by making a distinction based upon the above stated
factors.
Relating to Trial and the Trial Itself
The court has said that an order determining whether the case
should be tried by jury, the court or a referee relates only to the
practice and procedure and by no fair interpretation to the merits
of the action. Therefore,. such an order is not appealable.1S Like-
wise, an order refusing to consolidate cases for trial is not appeal-
able.10 The same is true of an order refusing to stay proceedings." 0
106. McClearn v. Arnold, 173 Minn. 183, 217 N. W. 106 (1927).
107. Rogers v. Greenwood, 14 Minn. 333 (Gil. 256) (1869) ; Bingham
v. Supervisors of Winona County, 6 Minm. 136 (Gil. 82) (1861).
108. Bond v. Welcome, 61 Minn. 43, 63 N. W. 3 (1895) (order referring
case to referee).
109. Plunkett v. Lambert, 231 Minn. 484, 43 N. W. 2d 489 (1950);
Webster v. Bader, 109 Minn. 146, 123 N. W. 289 (1909).
110. Plunkett v. Lambert, 231 Minn. 484, 43 N. W. 2d 489 (1950);
Graves v. Backus, 69 Minn. 532, 72 N. W. 811 (1897).
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And it was long ago decided that no appeal would lie from a ruling
on evidence during the course of the trial, even though a formal
motion be made as to admission of the evidence.'11 Such a holding is
fully in accord with the general statement that matters of prac-
tice and procedure, over which the district judge has a wide range
of discretion, are not a proper subject of appeal, though they may
be a proper subject for review. It will take an extreme case to make
these holdings inapplicable to any ruling of the trial judge relating
to, or during, the trial.
Looking to Judgment
Orders having as their direct object the ultimate entry of judg-
ment have been held nonappealable under the third subdivision
for such orders merely seek direction that an act be done which in-
volves the merits."12 That is, an appeal does not lie from an order
that requires subsequent action to give it effect. 1" 3 Consequently, no
appeal can be had under this or other subdivisions from the decision
or opinion of the court,"14 from the order for judgment,1"5 from the
order denying a motion for judgment,"16 from the order granting" 7
or denying"' a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
111. Hullett v. Matteson, 12 Minn. 349 (Gil. 227) (1867).
112. See, e.g., Ryan v. Kranz, 25 Minn. 362 (1879) (decision and order
for judgment).
113. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. W. 580 (1940)(order denying motion for judgment).
114. Thompson v. Howe, 21 Minn. 1 (1874); Searles v. Thompson
Bros., 18 Minn. 316 (Gil. 285) (1872) ; Glahn v. Sommer, 11 Minn. 203 (Gil.
132) (1866).
115. In re Estate of Colby, 223 Minn. 157, 25 N. W. 2d 769 (1947);
Rieke v. St. Albans Land Co., 179 Minn. 392, 229 N. W. 557 (1930) ; Lowe
v. Nixon, 170 Minn. 391, 212 N. W. 896 (1927) (motion for judgment on
pleadings granted) ; State ex rel. Quale v. Penney, 144 Minn. 463, 174 N. W.
611 (1919); Arnoldy v. Northwestern State Bank, 142 Minn. 449, 172 N. W.
699 (1919); Supornick v. National Council of Knights & Ladies of Security,
141 Minn. 306, 170 N. W. 507 (1918) ; Nikannis Co. v. City of Duluth, 108
Minn. 83, 121 N. W. 212 (1909); Johnson v. Northern Pacific, Fergus
Falls & Black Hills Ry., 39 Minn. 30, 38 N. W. 804 (1888) ; Croft v. Miller, 26
Minn. 317 (1879); Rogers v. Holyoke, 14 Minn. 514 (Gil. 387) (1869);
Lamb v. McCanna, 14 Minn .513 (Gil. 385) (1869) (motion for judgment
on pleadings and plaintiff's evidence granted).
116., Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn.. 637, 289 N. W. 580 (1940);
National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Garber, 132 Minn.
413, 157 N. W. 591 (1916); Fulton v. Town of Andrea, 72 Minn. 99, 75
N. W. 4 (1898).
117. Sanderson v. Northern Pacific Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542(1902). But see "Appeal from 'Whole Order,'" see text to n. 324-333, infra.
118. Lincoln v. Ravicz, 174 Minn. 237, 219 N. W. 149 (1928) ; Carl-
strom v. North Star Concrete Co., 132 Minn. 467, 155 N. W. 1039 (1916) ;
Hodge v. Franklin Ins. Co., 111 Minn. 321, 126 N. W. 1098 (1910) ; Hostager
v. Northwest Paper Co., 109 Minn. 509, 124 N. W. 213 (1910) ; Gay v. Kelly,
109 Minn. 101, 123 N. W. 295 (1909); Oelschlegel v. Chicago Great Western
Ry., 71 Minn. 50, 73 N. W. 631 (1898) ; St. Anthony Falls Bank v. Graham, 67
Minn. 318, 69 N. W. 1077 (1897).
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from an order granting or denying a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the disagreement of the jury,"19 from an order for dis-
missal, 1 20 from an order denying a motion to dismiss the action,'
21
from the findings of fact and conclusions of law, 22 from the order
denying a motion for amended findings of fact and conclusions of
law, 2 3 nor from an order denying a motion to affirm an order of an
inferior tribunal.124 This, of course, is also true where the motion
is made at the pleading stage by a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 12 5
Obviously the same would be true of orders relating to motions
for summary judgment made under Rule 56.126
Vacating Appealable Order
In Levi v. Longili127 an order of the district court was held
appealable which affirmed an order of the probate court that it had
no jurisdiction to vacate an order allowing an account of a guardian.
The court went on to hold that an order vacating the district court's
prior order of affirmance and reversing the probate court's order
was appealable for the prior order would have finally disposed
119. Johnson v. Burmeister, 176 Minn. 302, 223 N. W. 146 (1929).
120. Quevli v. First National Bank of Windom, 226 Minn. 102, 32 N. W.
2d 146 (1948) ; State ex reL. Gagnon v. Bjornstad, 125 Minn. 526, 147 N. W.
104 (1914) ; Gottstein v. St. Jean, 79 Minn. 232, 82 N. W. 311 (1900) ; Searles
v. Thompson Bros., 18 Minn. 316 (Gil. 285) (1872); Lamb v. McCanna, 14
Minn. 513 (Gil. 385) (1869).
121. Independent School District No. 84 v. Rittmiller, 235 Minn. 556,
51 N. W. 2d 664 (1952) (motion made after tender) ; Dady v. Peterson, 219
Minn. 198, 17 N. W. 2d 322 (1945) ; Pillsbury v. Foley, 61 Minn. 434, 63
N. W. 1027 (1895).
122. Johnson v. Northern Pacific, Fergus Falls & Black Hills, Ry.,
39 Minn. 30, 38 N. W. 804 (1888).
123. Johnson v. Giese, 230 Minn. 185, 40 N. W. 2d 909 (1950) ; State,
by Peterson v. Anderson, 208 Minn. 334, 294 N. W. 219 (1940) ; Anderson v.
Tuomi, 230 Minn. 490, 42 N. W. 2d 204 (1950) ; Dow v. Bittner, 185 Minn.
499, 241 N. W. 569 (1932) ; Hoyt v. Kittson County State Bank, 180 Minn.
93, 230 N. W. 269 (1930); Nikannis Co. v. City of Duluth, 108 Minn. 83,
121 N. W. 212 (1909) ; Savings Bank of St. Paul v. St. Paul Plow Co., 76
Minn. 7, 78 N. W. 873 (1899) ; Shepard v. Pettit, 30 Minn. 119, 14 N. W.
511 (1883).
124. McGinty v. Kelley, 85 Minn. 117, 88 N. W. 430 (1901); Kelly v.
Hopkins, 72 Minn. 258, 75 N. AV. 374 (1898).
125. McClearn v. Arnold, 173 Minn. 183, 217 N. W. 106 (1927) (motion
denied); Lowe v. Nixon, 170 Minn. 391, 212 N. W. 896 (1927) (motion
granted); Rogers v. Holyoke, 14 Minn. 514 (Gil. 387) (1869) (motion
granted) ; McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357 (Gil. 232) (1866) (motion
denied).
126. Shema v. Thorpe Bros. (Minn., opinion filed February 27, 1953)
(order granting summary judgment nonappealable). Language in Settem v.
Etter, 53 N. W. 2d 467 (Minn. 1952), also confirms this. In the Settem case
a writ of certiorari to review an order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment was denied, the court saying the order was an intermediate one.
127. 82 Minn. 324, 84 N. W. 1017 (1901).
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of the matter on the merits. The vacation of that order deprived the
party of the benefit of such disposition and so affected his strict
legal rights. Apparently, however, had the order merely vacated
the prior order for purposes of again hearing the matter there
decided, that is, vacated the prior order provisionally, the vacating
order would not be appealable. 2
Generalizing the Levi case, it might be said that an order
vacating an appealable order is also appealable. The appealability of
orders vacating or refusing to vacate nonappealable orders is con-
sidered later.
Post Judgment
1. Vacate Judgment
An order refusing to vacate a judgment claimed to be unauthor-
ized may be appealed from for the party has a strict legal right
to have an unauthorized judgment vacated and set aside.1 29 But an
appeal will not lie from an order refusing to vacate an erroneous
judgment. 30 It should be noted that while Piper v. Johnston"'
placed this on subdivision three, the order more appropriately be-
longs under subdivision seven, as the court ruled in the Spalding"'2
case.
It would also seem that the party who had obtained the judg-
ment could appeal from an order which vacates the judgment on
the ground that the judgment was unauthorized, since, if the judg-
ment were authorized the order would aversely affect his rights
in the judgment. In Holmes v. Campbell'33 the court, in holding
appealable an order vacating a judgment, stated:
"Any order of the court which cancels it [the judgment], or
modifies it effect, or suspends its operation, or the right of the
plaintiff [prevailing party] to enforce the same, materially
affects the legal rights of the party in whose favor it is rendered.
and ... involves the merits of the action, and unless it is with-
in the discretion of the court it is appealable."
128. State v. Crosley Park Land Co., 63 Minn. 205, 65 N. W. 268(1895) (order vacating order vacating a judgment so as to hear over first
vacating order) ; see It re Studdardt, 30 Minn. 553, 16 N. W. 452 (1883).
But see Barrett v. Smith, 183 Minn. 431, 439, 237 N. V. 15, 19 (1931),
where the court said the order entered after the provisional vacation would
be appealable even if time to appeal from the vacated order had expired.
129. Kelly v. Anderson, 156 Minn. 71, 194 N. NV. 102 (1923); Piper
v. Johnston, 12 Minn. 60 (Gil. 27) (1866) (on appeal judgment found to
be authorized).
130. Breslaw v. Breslaw, 229 Minn. 371, 39 N. W. 2d 499 (1949);
Gasser v. Spalding, 164 Minn. 443, 205 N. W. 374 (1925).
131. 12 Minn. 60 (Gil. 27) (1866).
132. Gasser v. Spalding, 164 Minn. 443, 205 N. W. 374 (1925).
133. 13 Minn. 66 (Gil. 58) (1868).
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The order there involved was not made within the discretion of the
court because made after the time had run for a discretionary vaca-
tion of the judgment.134
Where, however, an order vacates a prior order vacating a
judgment for the purpose of another hearing on the merits as to
whether the judgment should be vacated, the order which provi-
sionally vacates the earlier order is not appealable 5 for it neither
denies the last vacating motion nor does it reinstate the judgment.
The court has several times allowed an appeal from an order vacat-
ing a judgment entered after settlement and reinstating the case on
the calendar when made well within the time for appeal from the
judgment, the granting of which order was obviously within the
sound discretion of the trial judge.3 86 Relying on these cases the
court recently held that an order vacating a prior order of dismissal
pursuant to a settlement, no judgment having been entered, was
appealable under subdivisions three and seven.'3 7 It must be as-
sumed that this case stands for the proposition that the defendant's
positive or strict legal rights not to have the case revived were
affected with finality by this order and so the order "involved the
merits." The court's reliance on subdivision seven is clearly
unwarranted for it was neither a special proceeding nor was it made
after judgment, no judgment ever having been entered. This
being so there was nothing to which subdivision seven could apply.
2. Vacation Discretionary
(§544.32-Rule 60.02)
If the order vacating a judgment was made under the discre-
tionary power of the now superseded § 544.32, the court at first held
the order nonappealable. 3 s It soon adopted the view that the order
was not appealable unless there was an abuse of discretion. Before
long the court decided that an order vacating a judgment made
under the discretionary power of the trial court was appealable as
an order involving the merits. This final step was made by judge
134. See also State ex¢ rel. Beede v. Funck, 211 Minn. 27, 299 N. W. 684(1941) (order vacating a dismissal more than year after dismissal) ; County
of Chisago v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., 27 Minn. 109, 6 N. W. 454 (1880)(judgment set aside on ground that court had no jurisdiction to enter suchjudgment).
135. State v. Crosley Park Land Co., 63 Minn. 205, 65 N. W. 268 (1895).
136. Rishmiller v. Denver & R. G. R. R., 134 Minn. 261, 159 N. W.
272 (1916) ; Picciano v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Ry., 102 Minn. 21, 112
N. W. 885 (1907).
137. Elsen v. State Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., 217 Minn. 564, 14
N. W. 2d 859 (1944).
138. Westervelt v. King, 4 Minn. 320 (Gil. 236) (1860).
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Mitchell in People's Ice Co. v. Schenker,"9 and is now well estab-
lished. 140 The court has also held that an order, made within the
court's discretionary powers, refusing to vacate a judgment is
appealableY.
4
'
From the foregoing two things are obvious. First, although the
court has adhered to the rule that this subdivision cannot be used
for appealing from a discretionary order, orders made under the
discretionary power of former § 544.32 are a major exception
to the rule. Second, the court has used subdivision three for post
judgment orders as well as for pre judgment orders. Whether
its use for post judgment orders is generally necessary is open
to doubt since post judgment orders would seem to fit more appro-
priately under subdivision seven.
Miscellaneous
Several other cases seem worthy of comment.
The granting of attorney fees to the wife's attorney in a divorce
suit is appealable under this subdivision. This is so whether the
order allowing the fees is made between the first and second trial
of the action' 2 or after judgment of dismissal.14 3
In Edelstein v. Levine 4  the court opened a further method
of obtaining review of an order granting a new trial. Where the
time in which such an order may be made has run before it is made,
the party adversely affected by such order may appeal from an order
denying his motion to dismiss the motion for a new trial since such
denial is deemed to determine the strict legal rights of the parties.
But unless the time has run, or for some other reason the lower court
is without authority to grant a new trial, an order refusing to vacate
an order for a new trial will be nonappealable for it is in effect an
order refusing to vacate a nonappealable order. 45
In Johnson v. Burmeistere 4 an appeal was unsuccessfully at-
tempted from an order denying a motion for judgment nothwith-
139. 50 Minn. 1, 52 N. W. 219 (1892).
140. E.g., Peterson v. W. Davis & Sons, 216 Minn. 60, 11 N. W. 2d
800 (1943) ; Isenee Motors v. Rand, 196 Minn. 267, 264 N. W. 782 (1936);
Stebbins v. Friend, Crosby & Co., 178 Minn. 649, 228 N. W. 150 (1929).
141. Barrie v. Northern Assurance Co., 99 Minn. 272, 109 N. XV. 248(1906).
142. Schuster v. Schuster, 84 Minn. 403, 87 N. W. 1014 (1901).
143. Wagner v. Wagner, 34 Minn. 441, 26 N. W. 450 (1886) (said to
affect strict legal rights because court without authority to so order).
144. 179 Minn. 136, 228 N. W. 558 (1930).
145. See Marty v. Nordby, 201 Minn. 469, 276 N. W. 739 (1937);
Davis v. Royce, 174 Minni. 611, 219 N. W. 928 (1928).
146. 176 Minn. 302, 223 N. W. 146 (1929).
19531
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standing the disagreement of the jury. In holding the order non-
appealable the court said:
"The order denying a judgment notwithstanding leaves the
the issues involved 'still pending before the court [below] and
undetermined' and so cannot be said to be an order involving
the merits or affecting a substantial right of the appellant within
'. . [subdivision three]."
And it should be noted that no review of such an order can be had
on appeal from a judgment of dismissal subsequently entered for
such order is said not to lead to nor necessarily affect the judg-
ment within the meaning of subdivision one.. 47 Although it might
be urged that if the party moving for such judgment is upon the
facts entitled to the judgment the denial of the motion deprives him
of his rights by forcing him to be subjected to another suit, yet it
may well be submitted in support of the Burmeister case that it
accords with the declared legislative policy. After denial of the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the disagreement of the jury,
the movant stands in substantially the same position as though the
court had granted a new trial after he had received a verdict. In-
deed, he does not stand in as good a position for he had never
received a verdict. Yet, the legislature has said that a party's rights
are not sufficiently affected by the granting of a new trial to allow
an appeal, unless the new trial be granted only because of errors
of law. It is unlikely that in the situation presented by the Bur-
meister case the result was due solely to errors of law. Thus, it would
seem that the court's conclusion in that case is fully justified.
SUBDIVISION FOUR
"From an order sustaining a demurrer, or from an order over-
ruling a demurrer if the court certifies that the question pre-
sented by the demurrer which it overrules by such order is im-
portant and doubtful and makes such certification a part of the
order, or from an order refusing a new trial, or from an order
granting a new trial if the court expressly states therein, or in a
memorandum attached thereto, that the order is based exclu-
sively upon errors of law occurring at the trial, and upon no
other ground; and the court shall specify such errors in its
order or memorandum, but upon appeal, such order granting
a new trial may be sustained for errors of law prejudicial to
respondent other than those specified by the trial court :"
History
As previously noted this subdivision has received the most
147. Bolstad v. Paul Bunyan Oil Co., 215 Minn. 166, 9 N. W. 2d 346
(1943).
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legislative attention. Conversely, to date it has required surprisingly
little judicial con~truction. The earliest "amendment" occurred in
the unofficial statutes of 1858, and appears to have been made without
legislative approval. This "change" consisted of allowing an appeal
from an order denying a new trial as well as one granting it.148 The
revision of 1866 took away the right to appeal from an order grant-
ing a new trial. 145 But the legislature the next year restored this as
an appealable order and went on to allow an appeal from an order
sustaining or overruling a demurrer.170 The next change occurred
in 1913 when the legislature curtailed the right to appeal from an
order granting a new trial by allowing an appeal therefrom only
when the new trial was granted expressly and solely because of
errors of law occurring at the trial, or where a new trial had once
before been granted because the evidnce did not support the verdict
an appeal was allowed from a subsequent order granting a new
trial on this same ground.1' 1 The purpose of this was to make non-
appealable those orders granting a new trial which lay in the sound
discretion of the trial court. This same act also limited the right
to appeal from an order overruling a demurrer. Although the
statutory language is not exactly the same as now, the substance of
this act is the game. Thus the Act of 1913 allowed an appeal only if
the district judge certifies that the question presented by the de-
murrer is important and doubtful and further makes such certifica-
tion a part of the order overruling the demurrer. From 1913 that
part of subdivision four relating to an order overruling a demurrer
remained in its same terminology until amended to read as it now
appears by the 1945 legislature. 1"- The status of an order granting
a new trial remained unchanged until the legislature in 1931 again
tried to amend this subdivision."53
The 1931 amendment was poorly drafted and ambiguous as to
whether the legislature intended to expand the scope of review on
appeal from an order granting a new trial or intended to further
limit the allowable scope of review. In Spicer v. Stebbins"4 the
court concluded that the legislature intended to further restrict
the scope of possible appeal by: 1) requiring the reasons for
granting a new trial on errors of law to appear in the order or
148. Pub. Stat. 1858, c. 71, § 11.
149. Rev. Stat. 1866, c. 86, § 8.
150. Minn. Laws 1867, c. 63, § 1.
151. Mi n. Laws 1913, c. 474, § 1.
152. Minn. Laws 1945, c. 463, § 1.
153. Minn. Laws 1931, c. 252.
154. 184 Minn. 77, 237 N. W. 844 (1931).
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memorandum (a requirement existing since 1913 and not affected
by the 1931 act, although this apparently was overlooked by the
court and the bar' 5 ), and 2) removing the right to appeal from
such an order where the same order had been made on a prior
trial because of insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict.
This part of the subdivision as it now stands was enacted in
1 9 45 .1 Apparently no changes were intended; rather, it seems
merely to have been intended to remove the ambiguity and to make
explicit the construction the court had already placed on the sub-
division as it previously read.
Sustaining a Demurrer'57
The phrase "from an order sustaining a demurrer" is clear
and has necessitated almost no judicial construction. One appel-
lant recently, however, fell into trouble that he hardly could have
anticipated when the court in Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Lang'58
held that although he had appealed from an order sustaining a
demurrer, he had appealed from a nonappealable order because
he had appealed from that order after judgment had been entered
against him. The court took the view that the entry of judgment
cut off the appealability of such an intermediate order. Aware of
an opposite rule pertaining to orders made appealable by another
part of the fourth subdivision, orders denying a new trial, the
court said that that was a distinguishable situation because the
statute gives a right to move for such orders after as well as before
judgment. The judgment terminated the order's appealability even
though the judgment was irregular in that it neither provided for
dismissal of the action nor for costs and disbursements for such
judgment was still a final determination of the rights of the parties.
The court did not, however, state that the judgment was final for
purposes of appeal. But on the basis of the Lang case, it would seem
that such an argument might be made even though the previously
existing rule was to the contrary. 5 9
Further, although the court had before it only an order sus-
taining a demurrer, much of the language as to a judgment cutting
off the appealability of an order would apply to any order which
155. See -udson-Duluth Furriers, Inc. v. McCullough, 182 Minn. 581,
235 N. W. 537 (1931).
156. See supra n. 152.
157. The part of subdivision four relating to the sustaining or over-
ruling of a demurrer has been rendered obsolete by Rule 7.01.
158. 230 Minn. 118, 41 N. W. 2d 429 (1950). Case criticized Note, 35
Minn. L. Rev. 640, at 646 and 656 (1951).
159. See n. 25, mipra, and text.
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by its very nature must necessarily precede judgment. Thus, this
newly created rule as to orders sustaining a demurrer may well
be transferred to a large number of orders acquiring their appeal-
ability from the third subdivision.
The rule enunciated in the Lang case, however, has absolutely
nothing to recommend itself save shear formalism. To extend its
application would be unfortunate.
Overruling a Demurrer
Several cases have arisen since the 1913 amendment construing
the provision for an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer.
Without a certificate of importance and doubt by the district court
no appeal can be had from the order overruling a demurrer.16 0 But
the mere fact of certification does not remove the case to the
supreme court. The certificate merely preserves the right to appeal,
and unless the losing party appeals from the order there is nothing
before the court.""- But if there has been the required certificate of
importance and doubt and if the losing party has appealed then
the court has before it the issue of whether or not the demurrer
should be sustained, and all questions involved therein are before
the court.' 2 The fact that the district court certifies only certain
specific questions has no effect in limiting the power of the supreme
court to pass on all matters pertaining to the overruling order. 6 3
Denying a New Trial
Although used very often as the basis for appeal, in the main
few difficulties have arisen in the decided cases as to orders denying
a new trial.
The fact that judgment has been entered before the order
denying the new trial was filed does not affect the appealability of
the order.?1 4 And an appeal may be had from an order denying a
a new trial regardless of whether it was made in a court or jury
caseY" The mere fact that an appeal is taken from an order denying
160. Oehler v. City of St. Paul, 174 Minn. 66, 218 N. W. 234 (1928).
161. Oehler v. City of St. Paul, 174 Minn. 66, 218 N. W. 234 (1928);
Benton v. County of Hennepin, 125 Minn. 325, 146 N. W. 1110 (1914).
162. Marquette Trust Co. v. Doyle, 176 Minn. 529, 224 N. W. 149
(1929); Benton v. County of Hennepin, 125 Minn. 325, 146 N. W. 1110
(1914).
163. Marquette Trust Co. v. Doyle, 176 Minn. 529, 224 N. W. 149
(1929).
164. In re Estate of Hore, 220 Minn. 365, 19 N. W. 2d 778 (1945);
Shuck v. Hagar, 24 Minn. 339 (1877).
165. Chittenden v. German American Bank, 27 Minn. 143, 6 N. W.
773 (1880).
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a new trial will not prevent an appeal from the subsequently
entered judgment. 6 '
Where a motion for a new trial is granted in part and denied
in part, the movant may appeal from so much of the order as denies
his motion for a new trial.167 But the granting of a new trial unless
the prevailing party agrees to a remittitur cannot be appealed
from as an order denying a new trial until the condition has been
complied with by the prevailing party. 8
Even though the order denying a new trial is appealable, it will
be affirmed on appeal if the motion upon which it was made states
no ground for a new trial.169 And where the district court has
entered an order denying a new trial pro forma with the consent
of the appellant, the supreme court will refuse to review the merits
of the case on the ground that the appellate court will not pass on
questions that were not first considered below.'
70
In passing it should be noted that the court has held that an
order denying a new trial is not a "final order."' 7'1 The court said
that an order denying a new trial was "an interlocutory order which
does not determine the rights of the parties so as to dispose of the
case."' 7 ' Therefore, the order of the district court, in an appeal
from the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, denying the motion
for a new trial was not appealable since it was not a "final order"
within the meaning of § 217.30. Consequently, when it is a statutory
action and the statute allowing the action has its own appeals pro-
vision, at least when similar to § 217.30, there may be no right
of appeal from an order denying a new trial. The same view was
early taken of an order granting a new trial in a special proceeding
under subdivision seven.1
Where an appeal to the district court is dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, there is no basis for a motion for a new trial (there
166. Iz. re Estate of Hore, 220 Minn. 365, 19 N. W. 2d 778 (1945).
167. Morton v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 162 Minn. 436, 203 N. W. 218
(1925).
168. See Swanson v. Andrus, 84 Minn. 168, 87 N. W. 363 (1901) (until
compliance it is a conditional order, only upon compliance does it become
a final, appealable order).
169. Julius v. Lenz, 212 Minn. 201, 3 N. W. 2d 10 (1942) ; Hoyt v.
Kittson County State Bank, 180 Minn. 93, 230 N. W. 269 (1930) ; Spencer v.
Stanley, 74 Minn. 35, 76 N. W. 953 (1898).
170. Johnson v. Howard, 25 Minn. 558 (1879).
171. State and Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. R. I. M. T. Co., 209
Minn. 105, 295 N. W. 519 (1940). Contra: Minnesota Valley R. R. v. Doran,
15 Minn. 230 (Gil. 179) (1870).
172. State and Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. R. I. M. T. Co., 209
Minn. 105, 113, 295 N. WV. 519, 524 (1940).
173. McNamara v. Minnesota Central Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269)(1867).
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never having been a trial in the district court) and if such a motion
is made an appeal to the supreme court will not lie from the order
denying the motion.17 4 The same reasoning and the same result
applies where the district court denies a motion for a new trial after
a demurrer to the complaint has been sustained,'1 75 or where the
order is denied by the district court upon an appeal to it on ques-
tions of law only.' 6 In neither case has there been a trial within the
meaning of the new trial statute. But in McCord v. Knowlton,
77
where a district court judge dismissed a motion for a new trial on
the ground that he did not have jurisdiction over the matter since
the case (although the decision had been rendered) was pending
before another judge, the court held that it could treat the order
dismissing the motion as an order denying a motion for a new trial
for appeal purposes. The last case is not inconsistent with the pre-
ceding ones in that the rationale of those cases does not apply to the
M1cCord case.
The case in which the order denying a new trial after a demurrer
to the complaint had been sustained, however, was distinguished
in Hine v. Myrick' 73 where judgment on the pleadings was entered
when the case came on for trial. This order having been made at
time for trial, the subsequent order denying a new trial was held
appealable. But the court, on authority of the Myrick case, recently
held appealable an order denying a new trial after an order for judg-
ment on the pleadings where it did not appear that such order was
made at time of trialY9 That this last case will be followed may
be doubted in view of the authority preceding it.
Granting a New Trial
In the main this part of the subdivision is self-explanatory and
needs little comment. °0 Its terms apply even to an order granting
174. Samels v. Samels, 174 Minn. 133, 218 N. W. 546 (1928) ; In re
Appeal of Seward, 156 Minn. 229, 194 N. W. 378 (1923).
175. Dodge v. Bell, 37 Minn. 382, 34 N. W. 739 (1887).
176. St. Cloud Common Council v. Karels, 55 Minn. 155, 56 N. W. 592(1893).
177. 76 Minn. 391, 79 N. W. 397 (1899).
178. 60 Minn. 518, 62 N. W. 1125 (1895).
179. Fox v. Swartz, 228 Minn. 233, 36 N. W. 2d 708 (1949) (appeal-
ability referred to in footnote only).
180. For examples of orders granting a new trial which would be ap-
pealable under the present subdivision four, see Weatherland v. Burau
54 N. W. 2d 570 (Minn. 1952) (memorandum stated new trial granted solely
because sealed verdict was a nullity where juror changed mind on poll);
Great Northern Ry. v. Beecher-Barrett-Lockerby Co., 200 Minn. 258, 274
N. NV. 522 (1937) (memorandum stated that court had been without juris-
diction to enter the findings it had made and so court granted a new trial
on this basis only); Gutman v. Anderson, 142 Minn. 141, 171 N. W. 303
(1919) (granted new trial solely because lower court deemed erroneous an
instruction it had given).
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a new trial made upon the court's own motion.18 There are, how-
ever, some aspects of the power to appeal from an order granting
a new trial that merit discussion.
The word "exclusively" used in the phrase "based exclusively
on errors of law occurring at the trial" means just that. It must
clearly and affirmatively appear that the occurrence of errors of law
was the sole ground for granting a new trial and that judicial dis-
cretion played no part.8 2 The order or memorandum does not
have to use the precise statutory terminology, although this is de-
sirable, so long as one or the other clearly shows that no judicial
discretion was involved in granting the order. 8 3 But if the trial
judge refuses to state the grounds for granting the new trial, a writ
of mandamus will lie from the supreme court requiring him to
state the grounds upon which he granted the new trial. 18 4 Also, the
error of law complained of must have occurred at the trial of the
action. Error at the time of granting a new trial is not within the
contemplation of this subdivision.8 5
When the conditions for an appeal have been complied with, the
respondent may sustain the order granting the new trial on an
error of law properly raised though not relied upon by the trial
court, but cannot question other matters, such as sufficiency of
evidence, to sustain the order on appeal.'8 6
The trial judge's characterization of the ground for his granting
a new trial as being an error of law is not decisive; that ground must
in fact be an error of law.187 Also, as this subdivision indicates, the
181. Montee v. Great Northern Ry., 129 Minn. 526, 151 N. W. 1101
(1915).
182. Citizens State Bank of St. Paul v. Wade, 165 Minn. 396, 206
N. W. 728 (1925) ; Doerner v. English, 221 Minn. 398, 22 N. W. 2d 217
(1946) ; Seorum v. Marudas, 216 Minn. 364, 12 N. W. 2d 779 (1944) ; State
ex rel. Weiss v. Moriarty, 203 Minn. 23, 279 N. W. 835 (1938) ; Thompson
v. Mann, 202 Minn. 318, 278 N. W. 153 (1938); Backstrom v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 187 Minn. 35, 244 N. W. 64 (1932) ; Spicer v. Stebbins,
184 Minn. 77, 237 N. W. 844 (1931) ; Karnofsky v. Wells-Dickey Co., 183
Minn. 563, 237 N. W. 425 (1931) ; Cook v. Byram, 178 Minn. 230, 226 N. V.
699 (1929) ; Kramer v. Bennett, 174 Minn. 606, 219 N. W. 291 (1928) ; Miller
v. County of Steele, 162 Minn. 85, 202 N. W. 68 (1925) ; Barwald v. Thuet,
149 Minn. 495, 182 N. W. 719 (1921); Schommer v. Eischens, 148 Minn.
486, 182 N. W. 166 (1921) ; Pust v. Holtz, 134 Minn. 266, 159 N. W. 564
(1916); Heide v. Lyons, 128 Minn. 488, 151 N. W. 139 (1915).
183. Weatherhead v. Burau, 54 N. W. 2d 570 (Minn. 1952).
184. State ex rel. Weiss v. Moriarty, 203 Minn. 23, 279 N. W. 835
(1938).
185. See Master Poultry Breeders, Inc. v. Iowa Hardware Mutual Ins.
Co., 219 Minn. 440, 18 N. W. 2d 39 (1945).
186. McAlpine v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 134 Minn. 192, 158 N. V. 967
(1916).
187. Voller v. Schmitz, 52 N. W. 2d 284 (Minn. 1952) (trial court said
new trial, unless plaintiff accept a lesser amount, was granted exclusively for
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order or memorandum must state just what the error is.'88
The requirement of granting a new trial because of "errors of
law occurring at the trial" is not satisfied by a memorandum stating
that as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient to support
the verdict."8 " In other words, insufficiency of evidence as a matter
of law is not the type of "error of law" contemplated by the statute.
Rather, it refers to the action of the trial judge upon such matters as
for example rulings and instructions. 190
Nor is inadequacy or excessiveness of damages such an error
of law.' 0 Thus, if plaintiff moves for a new trial on the sole issue
of damages the order granting a new trial on that issue only is not
appealable.10 2 But this does not mean that an order granting a new
trial on damages only is always nonappealable. If both plaintiff and
defendant move for a new trial or if the new trial is granted upon
defendant's general motion, then the order in effect denies a new
trial as to all other issues and to that extent is therefore appealable
as an order denying a new trial.'0 3 On such an appeal no review can
be had of the court's order granting a new trial on the issue of
damages.1 4 The same is true where a new trial is ordered upon one
issue after appelant's motion for a new trial made on more than
just that one issue. Again the order is appealable because it does
in effect deny a new trial as to all other issues. 93
But in two cases the court appears to have disregarded the above
stated principles as to what constitutes "errors of law." In Bakken-
errors of law but obviously the only error was excessive damages which is
not an error of law for this subdivision) ; Roelofs v. Baber, 194 Minn. 166,
259 N. W. 808 (1935) (inadequacy of damages characterized as an error of
law, order held nonappealable).
188. E.g., Voller v. Schmitz, 52 N. W. 2d 284 (Minn. 1952); Thompson
v. Mann, 202 Minn. 318, 278 N. W. 153 (1938); Spicer v. Stebbins. 184
Minn. 77, 237 N. W. 844 (1931).
189. Th6mpson v. Mann, 202 Minn. 318, 278 N. XV. 153 (1938) ; Kelly v.
Bowman, 201 Minn. 365, 276 N. W. 274 (1937) ; Thompson v. Chicago &
North Western Ry., 178 Minn. 232, 226 N. W. 700 (1929). The legislative
intent clearly is in accord because before 1931 an appeal could be taken from
an order granting a new trial for insufficiency of evidence only after the
same order had been entered in a prior trial. This added ground for an
appeal was dropped in 1931. Contra: State ex rel. Weiss v. Moriarty, 203
Minn. 23, 279 N. W. 835 (1938).
190. Roelofs v. Baber, 194 Minn. 166, 259 N. V. 808 (1935).
191. Voller v. Schmitz, 52 N. W. 2d 289 (Minn. 1952); Roelofs v.
Baber, 194 Minn. 166, 259 N. W. 808 (1935).
192. Marty v. Nordby, 201 Minn. 469, 276 N. W. 739 (1937).
193. Zywiec v. City of South St. Paul, 234 Minn. 18, 26, 47 N. W. 2d
465, 470 (1951) ; Lundblad v. Erickson, 180 Minn. 185, 230 N. W. 473 (1930);
Morton v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 162 Minn. 436, 203 N. W. 218 (1925).
194. Marty v. Nordby, 201 Minn. 469, 276 N. W. 739 (1937).
195. Lawler v. Counties of Rice and Goodhue, 147 Minn. 234, 178 N. W.
317 (1920).
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sen v. Minneapolis Street Ry.' 96 the court held that a new trial
granted on erroneous rulings as to laying foundation for evidence
was not within the purview of this subdivision and so not appealable.
And in State ex rel. Weiss v. Moriarty,97 a mandamus proceeding,
the court said that granting a new trial because there was error
in directing a verdict for defendant since it was contrary to law
and fact would fall within an "error of law occurring at the trial."
The order granting a new trial after entry of judgment, even
though not exclusively upon errors of law, is appealable as an order
vacating the judgment. 98 But where judgment has been entered
between the time of the court's announcement that a new trial would
be granted and the entry of the formal order, no appeal can be had
from the order granting a new trial because the judgment was a
"meaningless gesture."'199
SUBDIVISION FIVE
"From an order which, in effect, determines the action, and pre-
vents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken :"
This subdivision has remained unaltered since its original en-
actment200 and has required the considered attention of the court
very few times. This is no doubt partially due to its limited field
of possible operation and perhaps caused in part by appellants not
asserting its application.
The cases so far decided point up three or four main types of
orders which are made appealable by this subdivision.
Based on Jurisdiction
First, an order dismissing the action on the basis of lack of
jurisdiction, whether it be over the parties or the subject matter
or for some other reason, which thereby purportedly terminates the
authority of the court to act further in the matter comes within the
196. 180 Minn. 344, 230 N. V r. 787 (1930).
197. 203 Minn. 23, 279 N. W. 835 (1938).
198. Ayer v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. R., 189 Minn.
90, 359, 248 N. W. 749, 249 N. W. 581 (1933); Vasatka v. Matsch, 216
Minn. 530, 13 N. W. 2d 483 (1944) ; Kruchowski v. St. Paul City Ry., 195
Minn. 537, 263, 616 (1935). Contra: Cook v. Byram, 178 Minn. 230, 226 N. IV.
699 (1929) (order granting new trial held nonappealable because not in con-
formity with subdivision four. Court stated: "It is true it vacated a judg-
ment entered by appellants before defendants had an opportunity to move for
a new trial * * *.").
199. Olson v. Heise, 197 Minn. 441, 267 N. W. 425 (1936) (order
entered nunc pro tunc).
200. Its history antedates the 1856 enactment. This subdivision is sub-
stantially the same provision as Rev. Stat. 1851, c. 81, § 11(2).
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express terms of the fifth subdivision, and thus is appealable.2 1' But
it is essential that such order divests the court of authority to
act further, i.e., enter judgment of dismissal, or the general rule
that no appeal can be had from an order of dismissal will be
applicable.202 Thus, an appeal was allowed under this provision from
an order of the district court dismissing an appeal from a justice
court on jurisdictional grounds in Ross v. Evans, 20 3 but when the
same basic fact situation again arose the appeal was dismissed 20 4
because in the interim the legislature had extended the lower court's
power to enter a judgmnt of dismissal on such an appeal from a
justice court. So, the order of dismissal for jurisdictional reasons no
longer prevented the district court from acting further-a judg-
ment from which an appeal could be taken was made possible.
Although an order which rejects a party's contention that the
court lacks jurisdiction in the proceeding may be appealable as an
order involving the merits, yet it is not appealable under subdivision
five for it in no way determines the action or prevents entry of a
judgment. 20 5 In other words, the mere presence of a contest over
jurisdiction does not affect the order's appealability under this
subdivision unless by the court's assertion of lack of jurisdiction it
has rendered itself impotent to act further.
On this aspect of the subdivision, it should be noted that al-
though the court in Chadbourne v. Reed20 6 held an order perma-
nently striking a case from the calendar appealable under the third
subdivision its reasoning would seem to bring it more properly
under this subdivision.
The general rule that no appeal can be taken from an order
dismissing an action is illustrated by the early case of Jones v.
Rahilly.2 1' 7 There an order dismissing the action before trial on
plaintiff's motion was held nonappealable under this subdivision.
The order did not determine the action or prevent entry of an ap-
pealable judgment because the statutory predecessor of Rule 41.01
expressly provided for entry of judgment of dismissal in such
circumstances.
201. Bulau v. Bulau, 208 Minn. 529, 294 N. W. 845 (1940) ; Samels v.
Samels, 174 Minn. 133, 218 N. W. 546 (1928) (opinion may be based on
subdivision five or seven, or both) ; Roth v. Evans, 30 Minn. 206, 14 N. W.
897 (1883).
202. Bulau v. Bulau, 208 Minn. 529, 294 N. W. 845 (1940).
203. 30 Minn. 206, 14 N. W. 897 (1883).
204. Graham v. Conrad, 66 Minn. 470, 69 N. W. 215 (1896).
205. Plano Mfg. Co. v. Kaufert, 86 Minn. 13, 89 N. W. 1124 (1902)
206. 83 Minn. 447, 86 N. W. 415 (1901).
207. 16 Minn. 177 (Gil. 155) (1870).
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Phillips v. Brandt,0 8 the most recent case on this subdivision,
appears to have entirely discarded the rule of the Rahilly and similar
cases. In this taxpayers' representative suit, after entry of an order
for judgment for plaintiff he moved from the area and so was no
longer an appropriate party. Other taxpayers appealed from an
order refusing to substitute them as named plaintiffs. Defendants
argued that since a judgment of dismissal could still be entered
the order was not appealable under this subdivision. But the court
held the order appealable, saying: "We do not agree with this con-
struction. * * * an order which finally determines the action and
prevents entry of a judgment already ordered in favor of a party
thereto falls within the classification set forth in § 605.09(5). While
judgment for dismissal may constitute a final determination of the
action, so also an order which denies to the prevailing party the right
to enter a judgment previously ordered in his favor."
Since it is obvious that the court did not realize that the view
enunciated in the Phillips opinion was inconsistent with its prior
decisions, we can only speculate whether the inability to enter a
judgment of dismissal will now be dropped from the requirements
of this subdivision.
Dismissal of Appeal to District Court
Second, Judge Mitchell, writing for the court, held that an
order dismissing an appeal taken to the district court came within
the express terms of this subdivision and was therefore appeal-
able .2° This would seem to be true of any order dismissing an ap-
peal to the district court, where the statute authorizing such appeal
did not provide for any further action in disposing of the appeal. But
if further action was contemplated, for example, judgment of dis-
missal, then the order of dismissal would not seem to be appeal-
able by analogy to the jurisdictional dismissal cases.2 1 0 If the order
denies a motion to dismiss an appeal taken to the district court,
then, of course, the order is not appealable under this subdivision. 2"
Striking a Complaint
Third, in Lovering v. Webb Publisling Co.,2 12 in addition to
208. 231 Minn. 423, 43 N. W. 2d 285 (1950). Only case referred to
by court is Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950).
That case was not concerned with subdivision five. None of the cases which
have discussed fifth subdivision and added requirement that no judgment
of dismissal can be entered were so much as referred to.
209. Town of Haven v. Orton, 37 Minn. 445, 35 N. W. 264 (1887).
210. See n. 204, supra.
211. Rabitte v. Nathan, 22 Minn. 266 (1875) (nor, as this case held,
under subdivision three).
212. 108 Minn. 201, 120 N. W. 688 (1909).
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holding an order, requiring the complaint to be made more definite
and certain and in default thereof to strike the complaint, appealable
as an order involving the merits, the court also took the view that
the order was appealable under subdivision five. It was considered
so appealable because the order was one which in effect struck
the complaint, and "when the complaint is stricken out, the action
ends, and no judgment can be entered therein." This was perhaps
unnecessary language since the appeal was held authorized under
the third subdivision, but if it is followed by the court it would
mean that orders striking the complaint, or setting aside service
of summons and complaint, would be appealable under the fifth
subdivision, as well as the third.
Reinstating a Judgment
Fourth, an order is appealable under this subdivision which
vacates an order vacating a judgment and expressly or necessarily
reinstates the judgment previously vacated after time to appeal
from the original judgment has expired.213 Thus, although there
was a judgment, that judgment would not be appealable when re-
instated. Therefore, since the order of reinstatement is made it
both determines the action and prevents entry of a judgment from
which an appeal might be taken. But where the order vacating the
previous order which vacated the judgment merely vacates the
first order for the purpose of rehearing the motion to vacate the
judgment on the merits, the last vacating order is not appealable.21 4
That order only provisionally vacates the prior order and thus
neither denies the motion to vacate nor reinstates the judgment. It
leaves the merits of the original motion to vacate the judgment yet
to be heard. Consequently, it is not an order which in effect deter-
mines the action nor does it prevent the entry of an appealable
judgment. Nor, as stated in the Crosley Park21 5 case, can it gain an
appealable status under either subdivision three or seven for the
same reasons.
But in Picciano v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Ry. 216 the court
seems to have ignored this reasoning. An order was there held ap-
pealable which set aside a settlement, order for judgment, judg-
213. Wilson v. City of Fergus Falls, 181 Minn. 329, 232 N. W. 322
(1930) ; Marty v. Ahl, 5 Minn. 27 (Gil. 14) (1860). In each of these
cases more than one year had elapsed from time of entry of judgment beforejudgment was reinstated.
214. State v. Crosley Park Land Co., 63 Minn. 205, 65 N. W. 268(1895).
215. Ibid.
216. 102 Minn. 21, 112 N. V. 885 (1907).
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ment of dismissal and an order striking the case from the calendar,
and ordered the case reinstated on the calendar. The order doing
so was entered within a month after entry of judgment. The court
said: "The order is appealable, for the reason that it determines
the strict legal rights of the parties, having put an end to the action
and prevented the entry of a judgment from which an appeal might
be taken." So far as the quoted language was intended to bring
the case .under subdivision three, the case seems unobjectionable.
But so far as it is intended to be within the purview of the fifth
subdivision the language seems clearly contrary to the facts. The
order reinstated the case on the calendar, presumably it would
go to trial and judgment would be ultimately entered. The mere
fact that it wiped out one judgment does not bring it within
this subdivision. The order did look toward the future entry of a
new judgment-a judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
For this reason the case seems clearly erroneous and of very ques-
tionable authority.
Nonappealable Orders
Other than as to the type of orders above discussed, reference
to the fifth subdivision has crept into opinions in instances where
the court has held the order then before it nonappealable. And then
the order's nonappealability is usually predicated on an inability
to come within the purview of other subdivisions and, in passing,
the court summarily notes that the order is not rendered appealable
by the fifth subdivision. A very frequent and time honored phrase,
with variations in wording, is: "The order * * * is not appealable.
It does not involve the merits of the action; it does not, in effect,
determine the action; nor is it a final order affecting a substantial
right in a special proceeding."217 Under this formula a number of
orders have been held nonappealable under the fifth subdivision.
Such orders seem so obviously nonappealable as not to merit discus-
sion. Consequently, they will be disposed of by merely listing them:
order refusing leave to file an amended complaint,2 18 order allowing
an amendment to the reply,219 order appointing a committee to con-
demn land for a cemetery,2 0 order denying a motion for judg-
217. Forest Cemetery Association v. Constans, 70 Minn. 436, 73 N. W.
153 (1897).
218. Swanson v. Alworth, 157 Minn. 312, 196 N. W. 260 (1923) (even
as against claim that such is necessary to constitute a complete cause of
action).
219. Greber v. Harris, 167 Minn. 522, 209 N. W. 30 (1926).
220. Forest Cemetery Association v. Constans, 70 Minn. 436, 73 N. W.
153 (1897).
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ment,221 order denying a motion to dismiss for laches. 222 order
refusing to set aside report of commissioners in proceedings for
condemnation of land for a railroad,223 order refusing to affirm an
order of the probate court allowing account of executor,224 order
denying motion to dismiss appeal from probate court,22 5 and an
order impounding money until determination of whom is entitled
thereto.220
SUBDIVISION SIX
"From an order or judgment made or rendered in proceedings
supplementary to execution :"
As earlier noted this provision was first enacted in 1889.227 It
was compiled with the statute relating to proceedings supplementary
to execution, and was not transferred to its present position until the
revision of 1905.
At least three times prior to this it had been determined that
orders made in proceedings supplementary to execution were orders
made upon a summary application in an action after judgment. For
such orders to be appealable, they had to fit within that part of
the present subdivision seven which states: "from a final order
affecting a substantial right made * * * upon a summary application
in an action after judgment. '228 In two of those cases the court
held appealable under that subdivision an order directing a judg-
ment debtor to pay the judgment creditor. In the other case, appeals
were attempted from an order directing the appellant judgment
debtor to appear for examination concerning his property, and from
an order referring the matter to a referee to take appellant's
answers. The former order was "in its nature, only initial or pre-
liminary, to set the proceedings in motion. The latter was simply
interlocutory and looked to further proceedings that would result
in a final determination." Hence, neither order was final and so
the court held them both nonappealable since neither fell within
the scope of the seventh subdivision.
Although subdivision six has been a part of § 605.09 since 1905,
only three cases have directly considered its scope-and only the
221. Rodgers v. Steiner, 206 Minn. 637, 289 N. W. 580 (1940); Na-
tional Council of K. and L. of Security v. Garber, 132 Minn. 413, 157 N. V.
691 (1916).
222. Dady v. Peterson, 219 Minn. 198, 17 N. V. 2d 322 (1945).
223. Fletcher v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 339, 69 N. W.
1085 (1897).
224. McGinty v. Kelley, 85 Minn. 117, 88 N. W. 430 (1901).
225. Kelly v. Hopkins, 72 Minn. 258, 75 N. W. 74 (1898).
226. Meachem v. Ballard & Co., 180 Minn. 30, 230 N. W. 113 (1930).
227. Minn. Laws 1889, c. 106, § 2.
228. Christensen v. Tostevin, 51 Minn. 230, 53 N. W. 461 (1892) (order
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first of the three contains any extended discussion of the intended
scope of the subdivision. The dearth of authority on this part of the
appeals statute is in part due to its very limited application-it is
necessarily confined to only proceedings under chaDter 575 of our
statutes-and in part to the fact that thus far the court has con-
tented itself with immediately proceedings to the merits of the
appeal from orders made in proceedings supplementary to execution.
Although there is nothing in the terms of this subdivision to
indicate that the order must be final, the first case dealing with it,
by reference to Rondeau v. Beaumette,2 2 9 quite wisely read in the
requirement of finality. Thus in West Publishing Co. v. De La
Mott 230 the order attempted to be appealed from, and held non-
appealable, was an ex parte order directing the appealing defendant
to appear before a referee for examination. The court said that it
would be a reproach to the administration of justice to construe
the subdivision so as to allow an appeal from every order in a pro-
ceeding supplementary to execution. The court also said: "WNe
hold that the statute here in question does not give an appeal
from an ex parte or preliminary or interlocutory order in pro-
ceedings supplementary to execution."
Thus it would seem that the requirement of finality of sub-
division seven has been read into the sixth subdivision.
The court in Freeman v. Larson,231 the next case on the sub-
ject, recognizing that ordinarily an order for judgment is not
under subdivision six. The court rested its holding that an order
for judgment is appealable when made in a proceeding supple-
mentary to execution solely upon quotation of the sixth subdivision.
Whether this was predicated upon a departure from the require-
ment of finality laid down in the De La Mott case is an open ques-
tion. But if that was the intent it would seem safe to predict that the
De La Matt case will remain the law and that Freeman v. Larson
will not be extended to orders other than the one there before the
court.
2 2
appealable) ; Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452 (1876) (order appealable)
Rondeau v. Beaumette, 4 Minn. 224 (Gil. 163) (1860) (order not appealable).
229. 4 Minn. 224 (Gil. 163) (1860). This is the case last mentioned
in the text following n. 228, .rzpra.
230. 104 Minn. 174, 116 N. W. 103 (1908).
231. 199 Minn. 446, 272 N. W. 155 (1937).
232. Freeman v. Larson was relied upon by way of footnote reference
in Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Trach, 233 Minn. 473, 47 N. W. 2d 197 (1951).
The order there held appealable was one releasing part of the funds caught
by a levy of execution and to pay over the remainder, this order being made
after parties requested the court to make findings of fact and conclusions
of law upon stipulated facts.
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The last case -3 held appealable, as against the contention that
it was not a final order in a special proceeding, an order made in a
proceeding supplementary to execution requiring appellants to pay
over funds to the receiver in the supplementary proceeding and
denying appellant's motions for amended findings or a new trial.
The order was held appealable under subdivision seven, and appar-
ently also under subdivision six, and apparently also as "a final order
in a summary proceeding." The pay over order would seem clearly
appealable under subdivision six, or on authority of the Tostevin234
case, under subdivision seven. That the court held the case appeal-
able is clear; but the court's reasons therefor are unfortunately
not so clear.
SUBDIVISION SEVEN
"From a final order, affecting a substantial right, made in a
special proceeding, or upon a summary application in an action
after judgment :"
Definition of Special Proceeding
Although this provision has never been altered,235 it has caused
the court, and perhaps the bar, a great deal of difficulty. Unfortu-
nately it is impossible to give any precise definition of a "special
proceeding." The Field Code as originally enacted defined it by
stating that it was every remedy other than an action, 23 6 "action"
being defined as: "An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court
of justice by which a party prosecutes another party for the enforce-
ment or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong,
or the punishment of a public offence. 23 7
Our court has several times attempted a similar noble, but
none to helpful, definition by stating: "'a special proceeding' is a
generic term for any civil remedy in a court of justice which is not
of itself an ordinary action and which, if incidental to an ordinary
action, independently of the progress and course of procedure in
such action, terminates in an order which, to be appealable pursuant
to § 605.09(7), must adjudicate a substantial right with decisive
233. Northern National Bank v. McLaughlin, 203 Minn. 253, 280 N. W.
852 (1938).
234. Christensen v. Tostevin, 51 Minn. 230, 53 N. W. 461 (1892). One
of the two cases referred to immediately following n. 228, supra.
235. This subdivision antedates the enactment of the general appeal
statute in 1856. It is found in almost precisely the same wording in Rev.
Stat. 1851, c. 81, § 11 (3). The provision appears to have been patterned after§ 11(2) of the First Report of the Commissioners of the Field Code (1848).
236. New York Code of Procedure 1851, § 3.
237. New York Code of Procedure 1851, § 2.
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finality separate and apart from any final judgment entered or to be
entered in such action upon the merits.123
8
Such definitions can be of only slight assistance in determining
whether a certain matter is or is not a special proceeding within
the meaning of this subdivision. Loose as the definitions are, they
are probably as specific as the subject allows for the term "special
proceeding" by its very nature covers a vast and diversified area
and is desirably flexible enough to embrace new situations. Included
within the framework of the term are: the extraordinary reme-
dies,2 39  contempt, 240  condemnation proceedings (eminent do-
main) ,24" determination of ownership of award paid into court in
condemnation proceedings, 24 2 garnishment,243 proceedings for at-
torney fees after divorce suit,2 4 4 proceedings by drainage engineer
to obtain pay for services 2 45  corporate dissolution proceed-
ings 2 4 6 proceedings to vacate a town plat,2 4T proceedings to estab-
lish a township road 2 4S proceedings for release from hospital for
insane,2 49 insolvency proceedings (now suspended by federal bank-
238. Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950);
Anderson v. Langula, 180 Minn. 250, 230 N. W. 645 (1930); Schuster v.
Schuster, 84 Minn. 403, 87 N. W. 1014 (1901).
239. Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 209 Minn. 67, 295 N. W. 406 (1940)
(certiorari); Moede v. County of Stearns, 43 Minn. 312, 45 N. W. 615
(1890) (certiorari) ; State v. Webber, 31 Minn. 211, 17 N. IV. 339 (1883)
(mandamus); State ex rel. Keyes v. Buckham, 29 Minn. 462, 13 N. W. 902
(1882) (habeas corpus).
240. Semrow v. Semrow, 26 Minn. 9 (1879).
241. In re Condemnation of Lands Owned by Luhrs, 220 Minn. 129, 19
N. W. 2d 77 (1945) (dam) ; State, by Burnquist, Attorney General v. Fuchs,
212 Minn. 452, 4 N. W. 2d 361 (1942) (highway) ; Duluth Transfer Ry. v.
Duluth Terminal Ry., 81 Minn. 62, 83 N. W. 497 (1900) (railroad); Conter
v. St. P. & S. C. R. R., 24 Minn. 313 (1877) (railroad); Minnesota Valley
R. R. v. Doran, 15 Minn. 230 (Gil. 179) (1870) (railroad); McNamara v.
Minnesota Central Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269) (1867) (railroad) ; Turner v.
Holleran, 11 Minn. 253 (Gil. 168) (1866) (mill dam). But see King v. Board
of Education, 116 Minn. 433, 133 N. W. 1018 (1912) (damages appeal in dis-
trict court said to be governed by rules relating to civil actions, including
appealability of order).
242. State, by Peterson v. Anderson, 207 Minn. 357, 291 N. W. 605
(1940).
243. Chapman v. Dorsey, 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950);
Security State Bank of Waldorf v. Brecht, 150 Minn. 502, 185 N. W. 1021
(1921).
244. Schuster v. Schuster, 84 Minn. 403, 87 N. W. 1014 (1901).
245. Gove v. County of Murray, 147 Minn. 24, 179 N. W. 569 (1920).
246. In re Dissolution of Olivia Co-op Merc. Co., 169 Minn. 131, 210
1. W. 628 (1926).
247. Koochiching Co. v. Franson, 91 Minn. 404, 98 N. W. 98 (1904).
248. In re Appeal of Seward, 156 Minn. 229, 194 N. W. 378 (1923).
249. State ex rel. Sundberg v. District Court, 185 Minn. 396, 241 N. W.
39 (1932).
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ruptcy act) ,20 election contests,2 51 proceedings in district court re-
lating to receivers, executors, trustees and guardians.
252
The above list of instances of special proceedings for purposes
of the appeals statute is not intended to be exhaustive but merely
illustrative.25 3 Nor is it to be assumed that the court in the above
types of situations always considers the appeal under subdivision
seven. For example, the court in Security State Bank of Waldorf v.
Brecht254 considered a garnishment proceeding as a special pro-
ceeding within the meaning of this subdivision, but in Fulton v.
0kes235 spoke of garnishment as a civil action in determining the
appealability of an order.
Final Order
Difficulty in determining what may or may not be deemed a
special proceeding is only an initial problem. As indicated by the
court's quoted definition of a special proceeding, to be appealable it
must be a "final order" in a special proceeding. There is hopeless
confusion in the various opinions of the court as to just what con-
stitutes a final order. This confusion is caused partly by the diversi-
fied scope of proceedings and methods by which such proceedings
may be finally concluded. It is due in part to an insistence by the
court that the first six subdivisions relate to ordinary civil actions,
whereas this is the only subdivision relating to special proceedings
and thus the rules applicable to other subdivisions are not pre-
cedent here, a rule of thumb which the court itself continually vio-
lates with consequent unexplainable, inconsistent results. It is also
250. It re Jones, 33 Minn. 405, 23 N. W. 840 (1885) ; In re Graeff,
30 Minn. 358, 16 N. W. 395 (1883).
251. Hanson v. Emanuel, 210 Minn. 51, 297 N. W. 176 (1941) (but
seems to take proceeding out of subdivision seven by statute saying "as in
other civil actions").
252. Atwood v. Holmes, 229 Minn. 37, 38 N. W. 2d 62 (1949) (attorney
fees in trust proceeding, not specifically so held, but by reference to earlier case) ;
In re Melgaard, 200 Minn. 493, 274 N. W. 641 (1937) (order setting aside
order settling trustee's accounts appealable, not expressly held special pro-
ceeding, but by reference to In re Rosenfeldt, infra) ; Macolmson v. Goodhue
County Nat. Bank, 198 Minn. 562, 272 N. W. 157 (1936) (trustee) ; In. re
Jaus, 198 Minn. 242, 269 N. XV. 457 (1936) (guardian); Fleischmann v.
Northwestern Nat. B. & T. Co., 194 Minn. 234, 260 N. W. 313 (1935)
(trustee) ; In re Rosenfeldt, 184 Minn. 303, 238 N. W. 687 (1931) (trustee) ;
Duncan v. Barnard Cope Mfg Co., 176 Minn. 470, 223 N. W. 775 (1929)
(receiver).
253. A pauper's settlement proceeding, although not stated not to be a
special proceeding, was said not to come under subdivision seven in In re
Stewart, 216 Minn. 485, 13 N. W. 2d 375 (1944) (appeal from judgment
allowed). Basis for decision was long standing practice of dealing with the
orders under other subdivisions. A settlement proceeding would, however,
seem as much a special proceeding as many of those enumerated above.
254. 150 Minn. 502, 185 N. W. 1021 (1921).
255. 195 Minn. 247, 262 N. W. 570 (1935).
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in part due to the feeling that § 605.08, relating to time to appeal,
must be read in conjunction with subdivision seven so as to limit
the time for appeal in special proceedings to thirty days. This latter,
though based on the sound proposition that the time for attacking an
action in special proceedings should be cut to a minimum, seems to
produce a predisposition toward finding an order appealed from
nonappealable. Perhaps the safest generalization that can be ad-
vanced as to this part of the subdivision is that a respondent seeking
dismissal of the appeal stands a good chance of finding precedent
for the order's nonappealability, regardless of what that order
happens to be.
Because of this, no attempt will be made to exhaustively re-
view what the court has done in applying this part of the seventh
subdivision. Rather, illustrative examples of what has arisen will
be briefly mentioned.
When the special proceeding, whether originally commenced in,
or only removed to, the district court, is dismissed by that court
for jurisdictional defects an appeal will lie to the supreme court on
the basis that that constitutes a final order affecting a substantial
right in the special proceeding. -56 This is because the order finally
disposes of the matter before the court. So also, an order refusing
to dismiss a special proceeding is appealable when the motion denied
raises jurisdictional questions. 257 Even when the dismissal is not
on jurisdictional grounds, the order of dismissal is nevertheless
appealable under the seventh subdivision, 258 and a later order re-
fusing to vacate the dismissal order is not appealable.2 9 However,
when the motion for dismissal is not based on jurisdictional grounds,
an order refusing to dismiss the proceeding is not appealable, since
the matter remains undisposed of before the court.2 60 The above
stated rules would seem to fit any proceeding properly under this
subdivision.
256. In re Appeal of Seward, 156 Minn. 229, 194 N. W. 378 (1923)
(town plat); Gove v. County of Murray, 147 Minn. 24, 179 N. W. 569 (1920)
(drainage engineer compensation).
257. Fulton v. Okes, 195 Minn. 247, 262 N. W. 570 (1935) (garnish-
ment, calls this a civil action) ; Krafve v. Roy & Roy, 98 Minn. 141, 107
N. W. 966 (1906) (garnishment, relies on civil action cases).
258. In re Jaus, 198 Minn. 242, 269 N. W. 457 (1936); Cummings v.
Edwards-Wood Co., 95 Minn. 118, 103 N. W. 709 (1905) (order discharging
a garnishee for any cause is appealable) ; M'Connell v. Rakness, 41 Minn. 3,
42 N. W. 539 (1889) (discharge of garnishee).
259. In re Jaus, 198 Minn. 242, 269 N. W. 457 (1936).
260. Kaeding v. Hacking, 206 Minn. 648, 287 N. W. 876 (1939)
(garnishment); Shallbeter v. Bernstein Co., 174 Minn. 604, 218 N. W. 730
(1928) (garnishment) ; Security State Bank of Waldorf v. Brecht, 150 Minn.
502, 185 N. W. 1021 (1921) (garnishment) ; Turner v. Holleran, 11 Minn.
253 (Gil. 168) (1866) (mill dam).
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Despite an early holding to the contrary 261 it is now well estab-
lished that no appeal will lie from an order appointing commissioners
in condemnation proceedings on the basis that such is merely an
interlocutory order which is subject to later review even though the
order determines that the land involved is necessary for the public
use for which the condemnation proceedings have been instituted.262
But under the old insolvency law an order appointing a receiver was
deemed appealable under this subdivision.26 3 If the basis for this
was that it adjudged the debtor insolvent and immediately and
adversely affected his interests in his assets, similar reasons would
be applicable where our present statutes provide for the appoint-
ment of a receiver. Consequently, it might be supposed that the
court would allow an appeal from the order appointing a receiver,
rather than to follow the rule of the condemnation cases.
It is also clear that an order refusing to set aside the report of
the commissioners in condemnation proceedings is not appealable
since it does not determine the proceedings. 64 The court has also
held that an order refusing to set aside the award of damages made
by the commissioners is nonappealable. -65
Under the suspended insolvency statute an order requiring pay-
ment over to the receiver of the insolvent was an appealable order
since it with finality affected substantial rights of the person com-
pelled to make the payment.266 The same rule governed proceedings
supplementary to execution while they were yet under the seventh
subdivision.2-6 7 And it may well be assumed that such rule will per-
tain to any special proceeding, such as receivership, where the court
may compel another to pay over. In garnishment proceedings the
court in Security State Bank of Waldorf v. Brecht268 held that
where the creditor of a garnishee is brought into the proceedings by
an ex parte order that order is nonappealable because ex parte, but
the order refusing to vacate that ex parte order deprives the creditor
261. In re St. Paul & Northern Pacific Ry., 34 Minn. 227, 25 N. W.
345 (1885) (overruled in the Duluth Transfer Ry. case, infra n. 262).262. In re Condemnation of Lands Owned by Luhrs, 220 Minn. 129,
19 N. W. 2d 77 (1945) ; State, by Burnquist, Attorney General v. Fuchs, 212
Minn. 452, 4 N. XV. 2d 361 (1942) ; Duluth Transfer Ry. v. Duluth Terminal
Ry., 81 Minn. 62, 83 N. W. 497 (1900) ; Forest v. Cemetery Assn. v. Costans,
70 Minn. 436, 73 N. W. 153 (1897).
263. In re Graeff, 30 Minn. 358, 16 N. W. 395 (1883).
264. Fletcher v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 67 Minn. 339, 69 N. W.
1085 (1897).
265. Kane v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 33 Minn. 419, 23 N. W.
854 (1885).
266. In re Jones, 33 Minn. 405, 23 N. W. 840 (1885).
267. Christensen v. Tostevin, 51 Minn. 230, 53 N. W. 461 (1892).
268. 150 Minn. 502, 185 N. W. 1021 (1921).
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of substantial rights and so is appealable under this subdivision. The
substantial rights affected are that the creditor must either come in
and defend or give up his claim to the debt owing. That these are
such rights as merit protection by allowing an appeal at this early
stage any more than analogous orders looking to lengthy proceed-
ings in condemnation cases is open to serious doubt. In Chapman
v. Dorsey0 9 the court recently cited the Brecht case with express
approval, and if for no other reason, it may be assumed that the
Brecht case will remain the law.
Many cases, however, based on the idea that the order refusing
to vacate an ex parte order is appealable are not likely to be followed
since the Dorsey case. Those cases blindly accepted a generalized
statement of the Brecht case and said that an order refusing to
vacate is appealable without also determining whether the last
order affected substantial rights as was claimed to be so in the
Brecht case. It was such a blind adherence that the Dorsey case
repudiated. An example of such a case that probably would not be
followed today is Carlson v. Stafford.2 7 0 In a garnishment proceed-
ing the court there relied upon cases arising under the third sub-
division in concluding that an order for judgment was nonappeal-
able. But the court went on to hold that an order refusing to vacate
the order for judgment was appealable. This latter order was said
to fall within the Brecht case exception to the rule that an order
refusing to vacate a nonappealable order is also nonappealable.
So the court held the order to be a final order in a special proceeding,
doing so chiefly on the admitted equities of that case.
Contempt cases present an extremely strict construction of
what constitutes a final order. The early case of Semrow v. SemroO T7
held that an order adjudging a party to be in contempt for failure
to pay alimony and directing him to be committed to jail unless
he purge himself of the contempt within a stated time was a condi-
tional order, and not a final order until one of the two alternatives
had occurred. Therefore, until it so became final it was not appeal-
able under this subdivision. In less drastic situations appeals have
been allowed from conditional orders.272 This rule places the con-
temnor in the precarious position of either having to pay that
which on appeal might be determined he need not pay or go to
jail for violation of an allegdly erroneous order. Why this "con-
269. 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 2d 438 (1950).
270. 166 Minn. 481, 208 N. W. 413 (1926).
271. 26 Minn. 9, 46 N. W. 446 (1879).
272. See n. 91, .mpra.
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ditional" order is not sufficiently final for purposes of appeal is hard
to ascertain. The rule seems to be born of formalism rather than
reality.
Unfortunately, later cases have fully accepted the Semrow case.
Thus, in Plankers v. Plankers272 the court went to the extreme of
holding conditional, and therefore nonappealable, an order com-
pelling the defendant husband to pay arrearages within ten days,
application for punishment for contempt having previously been dis-
missed by his wife. Quaere: did it take the passage of ten days to
make this a final order? Also based on the Semirow case, the court
early held nonappealable an order adjuding a party in contempt, but
reserving till later the imposition of punishment.2 74
One break in the stringent Sernrow rule occurred when in
Jackson v. Jackson275 the court held a stayed commitment order
appealable. Under the Semirow rule the order committing (not con-
ditional) is, of course, appealable under this subdivision.2 7 6
Orders which allow the final accounts of the trustee, guardian or
receiver are considered final orders for purposes of subdivision
seven.2 7 7 The judgment purportedly entered upon such an order is
not appealable.278
The rule that the judgment entered pursuant to a final order is
not appealable under subdivision seven cases is quite well estab-
lishedY.2 7 The only trouble is that the rule is not always followed in
cases that would seem to be clearly special proceedings; instead
the rules as to new trial, judgment and orders looking to judgment
of the other subdivisions are applied so as to make the "final" order
a nonappealable intermediate order.2 0
273. 173 Minn. 464, 217 N. W. 488 (1928).
274. Menage v. Lustfield, 30 Minn. 487, 16 N. W. 398 (1883) (for re-
fusing to appear for hearing in supplementary proceedings).
275. 168 Minn. 196, 209 N. W. 901 (1926).
276. Child v. Washed Sand & Gravel Co., 181 Minn. 559, 233 N. W. 586
(1930) ; Laff v. Laff, 161 Minn. 122, 200 N. W. 936 (1924).
277. Malcolmson v. Goodhue County Nat. Bank, 198 Minn. 562, 272
N. NV. 157 (1936) ; In re Rosenfeldt, 184 Minn. 303, 238 N. W. 687 (1931);
Duncan v. Barnard Cope Mfg. Co., 176 Minn. 470, 223 N. W. 775 (1929).
278. Duncan v. Barnard Cope Mfg. Co., 176 Minn. 470, 223 N. W. 775
(1929) ; see In re Rosenfeldt, 184 Minn. 303, 238 N. W. 687 (1931) ; cf. John-
son v. City of Minneapolis, 209 Minn. 67, 295 N. ,V. 406 (1940).
279. In re Dissolution of Olivia Co-op Merc. Co., 169 Minn. 131, 210
N. W. 268 (1926) ; Koochiching County v. Franson, 91 Minn. 404, 98 N. W.
98 (1904) ; Conter v. St. P. & S. C. R. R., 24 Minn. 313 (1877).
280. E.g., It re Guardianship of Hudson, 220 Minn. 493, 20 N. W. 2d
330 (1945) (suit for restoration to competency, order denying new trial held
appealable and court said could appeal from judgment, relying on § 605.09(1)
to (6)). And in Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, 66 Minn. 447, 69 N. W.
224 (1896) the court held nonappealable an order refusing to strike objec-
tions to the account of a receivership trustee on the ground that it left
1953]
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It was early held that an order granting a new trial, though
appealable at the time under subdivision four, was not appealable
when entered in a special proceeding281 because it was not a final
order. At about the same time the court held that an appeal would
lie from an order denying a new trial in a special proceeding be-
cause it denies the right to be heard over and substantially disposes
of the case. 2 2 But since then in State and Railroad & Warehouse
Com 'n v. R. I. M. T. Co.,"53 arising under a special appeals statute
which provided for appeals to be heard from judgments and final
orders "as in civil actions," the court held that an order denying a
new trial is not a final order so as to make it appealable. Since
the reasoning of this case is fully applicable to subdivision seven
cases, it is questionable whether the earlier case would be followed
today.
In the field of domestic relations numerous incidental, although
not necessary, orders may possibly come within the requirements
of subdivision seven as a consequence of the court's language in
Schuster v. Schuster.28 4 The court there felt that since an order
awarding alimony pendente lite is ancillary to the main divorce
action, the order might well be considered a final order in a special
proceeding.
the matters still standing before the court. When the reverse situation
arose in Fleischmann v. Northwestern Nat. B. & T. Co., 194 Minn. 234, 260
N. W. 313 (1935), and the lower court had discharged an order to show
cause why an accounting by the trustee should not be had, the court
relied on the M11enage case to hold the order nonappealable on the ground that
it did not finally dispose of the matter. This decision is either 1) clearly
wrong or 2) based on the idea that this was merely an order preliminary to
an appealable judgment. If the latter, then the court must have thought
the rules as to the first six subdivisions, and not the last subdivision, were
applicable. ln re Hudson, 220 Minn. 493, 20 N. W. 2d 330 (1945) (action
to restore an incompetent to competency, order denying new trial held
appealable under subdivision four) ; Salo v. State, 188 Minn. 614, 248 N. W.
39 (1933) (state bank insolvency proceeding, appeal from order denying new
trial allowed) ; In re Ahlman, 185 Minn. 650, 240 N. W. 890 (1932) (dis-
trict court order affirming order of probate court requiring guardian and
not ward to bear certain losses held not appealable); Ebeling v. Bayerl,
162 Minn. 379, 202 N. W. 817 (1925) (order of district court affirming
order to probate court refusing to allow final account of administrator held
nonappealable, court saying an appeal would lie from the judgment entered
on district court's order). A partial explanation for this inconsistent treatment
of appeals from judgments might be that the court at times seems to have
felt this brought the action under subdivision one where the statute govern-
ing the special proceeding provides for entry of judgment, see, e.g., Ebeling
v. Bayerl, mipra. Citation of further such instances would be of slight value.
281. McNamara v. Minnesota Central Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269)
(1867). But see King v. Board of Education, 116 Minn. 433, 133 N. W. 1018
(1912) (reaching opposite result and deprecating McNamara case).
282. Minnesota Valley R. R. v. Doran, 15 Minn. 230 (Gil. 179) (1870).
283. 209 Minn. 105, 295 N. W. 519 (1940).
284. 84 Minn. 403, 87 N. W. 1014 (1901).
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There are numerous special appeals statutes. 85 Many of them
provide that appeals shall be had "as in civil actions." The court
has taken two completely opposite views as to the applicability of
subdivision seven where such a provision is involved. The clause
has been construed not to take the case out of the subdivision.286
The opposite approach is taken in such cases as Hanson v.
Emanuel"287 where the court was of the opinion that when the statute
had a provision that an election contest, admittedly a special pro-
ceeding, was to be tried as a civil action then an appeal lies from
the order denying a new trial or from the judgment as in civil
actions. The court said that such an order or the judgment would
not be appealable if the appeal had to come under the seventh
subdivision. Which line of cases will be followed in the future is
impossible to predict.
Summnary Application
The part of the seventh subdivision relating to orders made upon
summary application encompasses those orders which may be
entered after the judgment which are based upon or seek relief
which affects the judgment. But to be appealable the order must be
final2 , and must substantially affect some rights of the parties.2 9
If one or the other of these is absent an appeal will not lie. But
these requirements have not proved to be particularly difficult. If
anything, this part of the seventh subdivision has not been utilized
as fully as possible.
Supplementary to Execution
As was mentioned under subdivision six, before 1905 final
orders in proceedings supplementary to execution were appealable
under this part of the present subdivision seven. Should the sixth
subdivision be repealed, such orders would yet retain their appeal-
able status as orders made upon summary application. In addition
to the pre-1905 orders discussed under the sixth subdivision an
order granting leave to issue execution on the judgment was held
to come within the terms of the summary application part of sub-
285. Some are cited in Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 640, at 653, n. 101 and
102 (1951).
286. E.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 209 Minn. 67, 295 N. W. 406
(1940) ; McNamara v. Minnesota Cent. Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269) (1867).
287. 210 Minn. 51, 297 N. W. 176 (1941). See also, e.g., King v. Board
of Education, 116 Minn.. 433, 133 N. W. 1018 (1912) (appeal from order for
new trial in condemnation case) ; Witt v. St. Paul & Northern Pacific Ry.,
35 Minn. 404, 29 N. W. 161 (1886) (appeal from judgment in condemnation
case).
288. See Rondeau v. Beaumett, 4 Minn. 224 (Gil. 163) (1860).
289. See Gasser v. Spalding, 164 Minn. 443, 205 N. W. 374 (1925).
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division seven and so was appealable. 290 Also, an order vacating an
execution sale and the sheriff's certificate was a final order affecting
a substantial right made upon summary application in an action
after judgment. 291 And an order requiring a sheriff to pay over
the proceeds of an execution sale was similarly appealable. 2 2
Satisfaction of Judgment
An order which refuses to satisfy the judgment of record after
settlement wherein it is agreed that judgment should be cancelled
and satisfied as of record is a final determination of a substantial
right after judgment so as to be appealable.2- 3 An order which modi-
fies a judgment after it has been satisfied of record is appealable for
the same reason 2 94 even though such modification is proper. Nor is
it necessary that the judgment be satified. An order which amends
the judgment comes within the purview of this part of the subdivi-
sion.2 95
Unauthorized Judgment
An order refusing to modify a default judgment so that the
judgment does not exceed the prayer for relief is appealable under
the provision here considered. 29 6 Such judgments are unauthorized
and thus may be vacated on motion. The court early suggested that
where a clerk enters a default judgment upon insufficient proof
of service of summons, this was not to be corrected by a direct
appeal to the supreme court but rather the correction should be
sought from the district court. From the district court's determina-
tion thereon an appeal will then lie to the supreme court under this
subdivision.29 7
Vacating Judgment
The court at an early date held that an appeal would lie from
an order refusing to open a judgment when the court by the special
statute under which the action arose (tax case) was given discre-
290. Entrop v. Williams, 11 Minn. 381 (Gil. 276) (1866) (at time of
decision could get execution upon district court's approval after five years
after judgment).
291. Hutchins v. Carver County, 16 Minn. 13 (Gil. 1) (1870) ; Tillman
v. Jackson, 1 Minn. 183 (Gil. 157) (1854).
292. Coykendall v. Way, 29 Minn. 162, 12 N. W. 452 (1882).
293. Ives v. Phelps, 16 Minn. 451 (Gil. 407) (1871).
2 94. Minneapolis, St. P., R. & D. E. T. Co. v. Grimes, 128 Minn. 321,
150 N. W. 180 (1915).
295. McElroy v. Board of Education, 184 Minn. 357, 238 N. W. 681(1931).
296. Nelson v. Auman, 221 Minn. 46, 20 N. W. 2d 702 (1945) ; Halvor-
sen v. Orinoco Mining Co., 89 Minn. 470, 95 N. W. 320 (1903) (see text
to n. 45 and 46, supra, for comments and criticism of rule of these cases).
297. Masterson v. Le Claire, 4 Minn. 163 (Gil. 108) (1860).
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tionary power to vacate the judgment. 29 s The basis for this was
that the order was a final order affecting a substantial right made
upon summary application. It would seem that this case placed
the appealability of the order refusing to vacate under the proper
subdivision, and that similar orders which arose under the now
superseded § 544.32 and other orders vacating or refusing to vacate
a judgment that have been held appealable under the third sub-
division should have been brought under this subdivision as orders
made upon summary application in an action after judgment.
The court, however, has not permitted an appeal from all orders
refusing to vacate a judgment. In Gasser v. Spalding" the court
held that when the motion preliminary to the order refusing to
vacate the judgment is not based on the discretionary or "good
cause shown" (e.g., fraud on the court) parts of § 544.32 nor on
the contention that the judgment was unauthorized (as opposed to
erroneous), then the order refusing to vacate the judgment is not
appealable. The court said that such an order affects no sub-
stantial rights of the movant. The Spalding case has been follbwed
in later cases which have laid down the proposition that when the
grounds for moving for such an order were matters that could be
raised on an appeal from the judgment itself, the order is not appeal-
able.3"O The court in these cases was concerned with the fact that an
opposite rule would open the door to making meaningless the legisla-
ture's limit upon the time to appeal from a judgment.
Greater Possible Use
One case seems particularly appropriate to illustrate the greater
use to which this part of the subdivision could be put. After a divorce
an application was made to reduce the required alimony payments.
After a hearing on the merits an order was made refusing the re-
quested reduction. On the appeal therefrom the court held the order
appealable 3°1 even though prior cases had questioned the appeal-
ability of such an order. No reasons were given for holding the order
appealable. But the order would seem to come squarely within "from
a final order, affecting a substantial right, made * * * upon a sum-
mary application in an action after judgment" and so should be
appealable.
298. County of Aitkin v. Morrison, 25 Minn. 295 (1878).
299. 164 Minn. 443, 205 N. W. 374 (1925).
300. Breslaw v. Breslaw, 229 Minn. 371, 39 N. W. 2d 499 (1949);
Johnson v. Union Savings B. & T. Co., 196 Minn. 588, 266 N. W. 169 (1936) ;
LaRue Iron Mining Co. v. Village of Nashwauk, 176 Minn. 117, 222 N. W.
527 (1928) ; Matchan v. Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 165 Minn. 479, 205 N. W.
637 (1925).
301. Haskell v. Haskell, 119 Minn. 484, 138 N. W. 787 (1912).
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ORDERS REFUSING TO VACATE PRIOR ORDER3 0 2
It has already been pointed out that the court has held that an
order vacating an appealable order is itself appealable. 30 3 The court
has recently clarified the appealability of orders in the two other
possible situations of orders refusing to vacate prior orders. In each
of the two situations there had been cases reaching opposite results,
and the court expressly overruled each line which favored appeal-
ability. Thus, in Bennett v. Johnson08 the court held that an order
refusing to vacate a prior appealable order was itself nonappealable,
reaffirming that line of cases which so held.3 0 5 And in Chapman v.
Dorsey30 6 the court held that an order refusing to vacate a non-
appealable order was also nonappealable, and further said that the
same is true of an order vacating a prior nonappealable order. In
doing so Chapman v. Dorsey also reaffirmed a long series of
cases.
3 07
But there is an exception to the rule of Chapman v. Dorsey,
as that case itself noted. Where the first order is nonappealable only
because made upon ex parte application, then the motion to vacate
cures that feature and so the order refusing to vacate gains the ap-
pealable status which the first order would have had but for its
ex parte nature.30 The express terms of the second subdivision so
provide as to injunctions for an order refusing to vacate an ex parte
injunction (or restraining order) is an order refusing to dissolve
an injunction.
302. For a fuller discussion of the problem, see Note, 35 Minn. L. Rev.
640, at 648-52, 657 (1951).
303. See text to n. 127 and 128, supra.
304. 230 Minn. 404, 42 N. W. 2d 44 (1950). For subsequent cases reach-
ing same result, see Burkholder v. Burkholder, 231 Minn. 285, 43 N. W. 2d
801 (1950) ; In re County Ditch No. 27, Renville County, 232 Minn. 329, 45
N. W. 2d 555 (1951).
305. E.g., Trickel v. Calvin, 230 Minn. 322, 41 N. W. 2d 426 (1950);
Kolb v. City of Minneapolis, 229 Minn. 483, 40 N. W. 2d 619 (1949) ; In re
Jaus, 198 Minn. 242,269 N. W. 457 (1936) ; Barret v. Smith, 183 Minn. 431, 237
N. W. 15 (1931) ; Worrlein v. Maier, 177 Minn. 474, 225 N. W. 399 (1929)
Little v. Leighton, 46 Minn. 201, 48 N. W. 778 (1891).
306. 230 Minn. 279, 41 N. W. 438 (1950).
307. E.g., Marty v. Nordby, 201 Minn. 469, 276 N. W. 739 (1937)
Davis v. Royce, 174 Minn. 611, 219 N. W. 928 (1928) ; Brochin v. Lifson,
172 Minn. 51, 215 N. W. 180 (1927); Lockwood v. Bock, 46 Minn. 73, 48
N. W. 458 (1891); Brown v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co., 44 Minn.
322, 46 N. W. 560 (1890).
308. McNamara v. Minnesota Central Ry., 12 Minn. 388 (Gil. 269)
(1867) ; State v. District Court, 52 Minn. 283, 53 N. W. 1157 (1893);
Security State Bank of Waldorf v. Brecht, 150 Minn. 502, 185 N. W. 1021(1921).
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APPEAL FROM THE "WHOLE ORDER"
§ 605.06
As already noted no appeal lies from an order granting or
denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.3s0a Nor
since 1913 has an order granting a new trial been appealable except
in increasingly limited situations. 30 9 But if a blended, i.e., alterna-
tive, motion for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial is made, will the
court's order then be appealable?
If the court denies both parts of the motion then no difficulty
arises because the order denying a new trial is appealable under
§ 605.09(4).
If, however, the court grants any of the other alternatives a
problem may arise if the appeal is from the "whole order." The
solution depends upon whether § 605.06 is an appealable order
statute. Curiously enough, the court has considered it as both in-
creasing its appellate jurisdiction and not expanding it.310
Section 605.06 was the first enacted in 1895s" and was four
times amended 12 before being partially superseded by Rule 50.02.31'
308a. See n. 117 and 118, stupra.
309. See text to n. 180-199, supra.
310. Compare, e.g., Snyder v. Minnetonka & W. B. Nay. Co., 151 Minn.
Minn. 36, 185 N. W. 959 (1921) (blended motion, judgment nmo.v. granted,
order appealable under § 605.06); Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry., 64 Minn.
312, 67 N. W. 71 (1896) (same), with Johnson v. Burmeister, 176 Minn.
302, 223 N. W. 146 (1929) : "Note the wording on 'appeal from the judg-
ment,' not on appeal from the order. We do not think § 9495 [§ 605.06], as
it now reads, was mean to increase the appealable orders beyond the ones
specified in § 9498 [§ 605.09]." See also, e.g., Kommerstad v. Great Northern
Ry., 125 Minn. 297, 146 N. W. 975 (1914) (present § 605.09 considered
controlling over present § 605.06).
311. Minn. Laws 1895, c. 320: "In all cases where at the close of the
testimony in the case tried a motion is made by either party to the suit
requesting the trial court to direct a verdict in favor of the party making
such motion, which motion was denied, the trial court on motion made thatjudgment be entered notwithstanding the verdict, or on motion for a new trial,
shall order judgment to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to
have a verdict directed in his or its favor; and the supreme court of the
state on appeal from an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial
in the action in which such motion was made may order and direct judgment
to be entered in favor of the party who was entitled to have such verdict
directed in his or its favor whenever it shall appear from the testimony
that the party was entitled to have such motion granted."
312. Rev. Laws 1905, § 4362; Minn. Laws 1913, c. 245; Minn. Laws
1915, c. 31; Minn. Laws 1917, c. 24. The only amendment important for our
purpose was the rather thorough one of the revisors of 1905. The statute
was then amended to read in part: "If the motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict be denied, the supreme court * * * may order judgment to be
so entered * * * on appeal from the whole order denying such motion when
made in the alternative form, whether a new trial was granted or denied
by such order." This language has remained the same since 1905.
313. Rule 50.02 and § 605.06 now read so far as is here pertinent: Rule
50.02 "(2) A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may include
in the alternative a motion for a new trial. When such alternative motion
19531
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The only two significant changes for appeal purposes were those
in 1905 and that effected by the Rules.
This statute relates only to jury trials. And for appeal purposes
the court has held it inapplicable to orders entered after blended
motions in court cases.314
Before 1913 the only problem that could arise if a new trial was
granted after a blended motion, was whether the movant who
sought the new trial could take the appeal. He could not appeal from
only that part which denied his motion for judgment n.o.v.315
But, relying on § 605.06, the court in the KaZ 31 6 and Handlef 17
cases held that where a new trial was granted the movant could
appeal from the "whole order." Certainly the movant was not an
"aggrieved party13 1 as to the order granting a new trial, and the
order denying his motion for judgment non obstante is not sepa-
rately appealable. Thus, appealability had to depend upon a notice
of appeal which specified an appeal from the "whole order."
After the 1913 act drastically reduced the appealability of an
order granting a new trial, the court in Kommerstad v. Great North-
trn Ry.31 9 threw out the Kalt and Handley rule. On a blended
motion the court in that case denied judgment n.o.v, but granted
a new trial, doing so in one order. Neither order was separately
appealable, "so * * * we have two nonappealable orders, embodied in
one, and the fact that they are so blended does not give them an
is made and the court grants the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, the court shall at the same time grant or deny the motion for a new
trial, but in such case the order on the motion for a new trial shall become
effective only if and when the order granting the motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict is reversed, vacated, or set aside." Section 605.06 "if
the motion for judgment notwitstanding the verdict be denied, the supreme
court, on appeal from the judgment, may order judgment to be entered, * * *
and it may also order, on appeal from the whole order denying such motion
when made in the alternative form, whether a new trial was granted or denied
by such order."
314. Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119
N. W. 428 (1909) ; Noble v. Great Northern Ry., 89 Minn. 147, 94 N. W. 434
(1903) ; Hughes v. Meehan, 84 Minn. 226, 87 N. IV. 768 (1901). When the
applicability of this section to a court case was first presented, the issue was
expressly left undecided, see Savings Bank of St. Paul v. St. Paul Plow Co.,
76 Minn. 7, 78 N. W. 873 (1899). See also Marso v. Graif, 226 Minn. 540,
33 N. W. 2d 717 (1948).
315. St. Anthony Falls Bank v. Graham, 67 Minn. 318, 69 N. W. 1077
(1897).
316. Kalz v. Winona & St. Peter Ry., 76 Minn. 351, 79 N. W. 310
(1899).
317. Westacott v. Handley, 109 Minn. 452, 124 N. W. 226 (1910). In
St Anthony Falls Bank v. Graham, 67 Minn. 318, 69 N. W. 1077 (1897),
when this issue was first raised by the court, it questioned the right of the
movant to appeal, but expressly left the issue undecided.
318. § 605.09.
319. 125 Minn. 297, 146 N. W. 975 (1914).
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appealable character. * * * the joinder of two nonappealable orders
does not transform them into one that is appealable."3 20 The court
rejected the claim that § 605.06 made them appealable. Since Kom-
nerstad neither party can appeal from the whole order which grants
a new trial, -12 ' unless the order comes within § 605.09(4), and
then only the person thus deprived of the verdict may appeal.
3 22
Since an order denying judgment notwithstanding the disagree-
ment of the jury is nonappealable, 323 by analogy an order which
permits a retrial of the action after a blended motion would
also be nonappealable.
Although the supreme court's power to act under the 1895 act
was predicted upon an "* * * appeal from an order granting or
denying a motion for a new trial * * *,-324 in 1896 the court in the
Kernan 53* case held appealable an order granting judgment n.o.v.
upon a blended motion. It reasoned that the legislature must have
intended such an order to be appealable as were orders denying
the whole motion or which granted a new trial. Twice thereafter
the court said the order granting judgment n.o.v. after a blended
motion was appealable.Y'2 But by way of dictum in Kornmerstad327
case the court said such an order was not appealable.
320. Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry., 125 Minn. 297, 146 N. W.
975 (1914).
321. Drcha v. Great Northern Ry., 178 Minn. 286, 226 N. W. 846(1929); Snure v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 139 Minn. 516, 166 N. W.
1068 (1918); Greenberg v. National Council K. & L. of S., 132 Minn. 84,
155 N. W. 1053 (1916) ; Ness v. Supreme Lodge of Order of Columbian
Knights, 129 Minn. 530, 152 N. W. 1102 (1915) ; Hansen v. Great Northern Ry.,
125 Minn. 524, 146 N. W. 976 (1914) ; see Snyder v. Minnetonka & W. B.
Nav. Co., 151 Minn. 36, 40, 185 N. W. 959, 961 (1921), where the court
said: "* * * if a new trial is granted neither party can appeal, unless the order
recites that it is granted exclusively for errors of law, and then only the party
against whom the motion was made can appeal." But see Lincoln v. Ravicz,
174 finn. 237, 219 N. W. 149 (1928), where defendant tried to appeal from
that part of the order denying judgment n.o.v., the court said: "The appeal
* * * is ineffectual. The result might be different had the appeal been from
the whole order." Citing the obsolete Kalz and Handley cases.
322. See Snyder v. Minnetonka & W. B. Nay. Co., 151 Minn. 36, 40,
15 N. W. 959, 961 (1921), supra, n. 321.
323. Johnson v. Burmeister, 176 Minn. 302, 223 N. W. 146 (1929).
324. Minn. Laws 1895, c, 320, supra n. 311.
325. Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry., 64 Minn. 312, 67 N. W. 71 (1896).
326. Peterson v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co., 90 Minn. 52, 95 N. W.
751 (1903) ; Steidl v. McClymonds, 90 Minn. 205, 95 N. W. 906 (1903). In
the Peterson case he opinion is silent as to whether the appeal was from the
"whole order." In the Steidl case the appeal was from the judgment and
what was said is dictum relying on the Peterson case.
327. Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry., 125 Minn. 297, 299, 146 N. W.
975, 976 (1914). The court stated: "Under the present statutory provisions
upon the subject, plaintiff could not appeal * * * from the whole order had
defendant's motion for judgment been granted." The Kernan case was not
mentioned.
1953]
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This Konmierstad dictum was expressly repudiated as inad-
vertent and the Kernan rule reaffirmed in Snyder v. Minnetonka &
W. B. Nay. Co.328 But under the Snyder case for the order granting
granting judgment after a blended motion to be appealable, the
appeal must be from the "whole order.
'329
In the Snyder case the court adopted the reasoning of the
Kernan case. It also argued that because judgment n.o.v. was
granted, had the court passed on the motion for a new trial it would
have been granted exclusively for the error of law in not directing
a verdict. The court's unstated by necessary conclusion that the
order therefore is appealable under § 605.09(4) is questionable for
two reasons. First, the court in fact did not grant a new trial.
Second, even assuming it had, insufficiency of evidence as a matter
of law is not an "error of law" contemplated by § 605.09(4) .330
The holding in the Kernan and Snyder cases is also subject to
criticism upon two grounds. First, there is nothing to suggest that
§ 605.06 as originally enacted or subsequently amended was in-
tended as an appealable order statute. Quite obviously it was first
enacted as a legislative sanction of the practice of moving for judg-
ment non obstante. It more properly belongs with the practice
statute than in the chapter of our statutes dealing with appeals
from the district court. The court at least once has said: "We do
not think § 9495 [§ 605.06], as it now reads, was meant to increase
the appealable orders beyond the ones specified in § 9498 [§
605.09] ."3-3 Even if it were an appealable order statute, this sec-
tion has always been entirely devoid of any language authorizing
an appeal from an order granting judgment notwithstanding. Since
1905, when the "whole order" phrase first appeared, the section
has read: "* * * on appeal from the whole order denying such
328. 151 Minn. 36, 185 N. W. 959 (1921). Again the opinion does not
affirmatively disclose that the appeal was from the "whole order."
329. Mallery v. Northfield Seed Co., 194 Minn. 236, 259 N. W. 825(1935) (new trial granted after blended motion, thereafter a motion to
vacate this order and order judgment n.o.v. was granted. Appeal from latter
order dismissed as not being from whole order) ; Rieke v. St. Albans Land
Co., 179 Minn. 392, 229 N. W. 557 (1930). In the Rieke case the appeal
was dismissed where it was only from the portion of the order granting judg-
ment n.o.v. (judgment n.o.v. ordered as to part and a new trial denied as to
part) entered after a blended motion. The court's own headnote states:
"Where an alternative motion for judgment non obstante or for a new trial
is made an appeal may be taken from the whole order disposing of the motion,
but not from only that part granting or denying judgment."
330. Thompson v. Mann, 202 Minn. 318, 278 N. W. 153 (1938) ; Kelly
v. Bowman, 201 Minn. 365, 276 N. W. 274 (1937) ; Thompson v. Chicago &
North Western Ry., 178 Minn. 232, 226 N. W. 700 (1929).
331. Johnson v. Burmeister, 176 Minn. 302, 223 N. IV. 146 (1929).
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motion [for judgment n.o.v.] when made in the alternative
form * * *." Yet, the court has held that the right to appeal is
statutory; a jurisdictional prerequisite to appealability.3 32
However, until the Snyder case is discarded § 605.06 is im-
portant as an appealable order statute in the single situation of
making orders for judgment n.o.v. appealable if the appeal is taken
from the "whole order."333
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it is obvious that some changes are in order.
Others will present themselves upon further reflection.
Basic to any proposal to improve appeals statutes is the deter-
mination of the proper balance between two conflicting goals. On
the one side is the desire for one-package appeals. On the other
side is the undesirability of continuing without correction proceed-
ings in an action which would be predicated upon an error of the
trial court that would ultimately require reversal on appeal. Unlike
the Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal practice does not provide
a tailor-made solution.33 ' Blind adoption of the federal practice
would only compound the confusion and further entangle us in the
mesh of jurisdictional prerequisites.
But even more important than changing some details of what
orders are appealable and clearing away much of the confusion
existing in the case law is the consideration of a possible alteration
of approach to appealable orders. The most urgent need in Minne-
sota is to repudiate either by judicial pronouncement or by legis-
lative enactment the "jurisdictional prerequisite" approach to ap-
pealable orders. Only then can the proper perspective between the
merits of the action and the technique of getting the case before the
supreme court be realized. If this is to be accomplished by legisla-
tive action then the supreme court should be specifically authorized
to hear appeals from nonappealable orders should it choose to do
so in the exercise of its discretion.
332. See n. 20, supra.
333. Rule 50.02 is obviously predicated in part upon the continuing
vitality of the Snyder case.
334. For instance, what is a "final decision" within the meaning of 28
U. S. C. A. § 1291? E.g., compare United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land,
129 F. 2d 678 (2d Cir. 1942), with City of Louisa v. Levi, 140 F. 2d 512(6th Cir. 1944), and compare St Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount Film
Distr. Corp., 156 F. 2d 400 (8th Cir. 1946), with In re Forstner Chain
Corporation, 177 F. 2d 572 (1st Cir. 1949).
